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SUMMARY
Communication methods have drastically evolved since the creation of writing. In an-
cient times, couriers carried written messages between persons directly. Today, people
communicate with satellites or underseao optical fiber. An important use of communi-
cations includes confidential data–such as military, banking, or personal information–that
cannot be transmitted plainly over a classical channel where everybody would be able to
read and copy. In ancient times, privacy was guaranteed with empirical systems. For ex-
ample, around 600 B.C., Nabuchodonosor, king of Babylon, wrote on his slaves’ shaved
skulls and waited for their hair to grow back, then sent them to his generals. One had to
shave the slaves’ head to read the message. One may notice the strength of such system:
an intercepted message would be detected.
The first real cryptographic systems appeared around 200 B.C. They were mainly tools
that made the decyphering very difficult for anyone that did not have the algorithm and
the encoding parameters. These systems were encoded either with substitution, mono-
alphabetic, poly-alphabetic, homophonic, or polygrams. As technology evolved cryptan-
alyst’s work simplified causing cryptographers to invented more complex methods. The
mastering of electricity lead to strong development of telecommunications, literally com-
munication between distant parties. It also resulted in cryptographic automatization using
electromechanical systems. The development of computers, enabling quick and repetitive
computation, revolutionize the cryptographic field. It have become more and more complex
ever since.
The need for secure communication is everywhere today. Though, it is not necessary
to have the same security level for home mail and for the red phone between Washington
and Moscow. Classical cryptographic systems rely on mathematical conjectures, which are
sometimes very complex. Today’s algorithms such as PGP or RSA rely on non-proven
xiii
mathematical conjectures, thus are potentially breakable. Such algorithm are sufficient
tough for personal use.
To have perfectly secure communications, Shannon communication theory showed the
need for a secret key between parties. Theoretically, classical communications cannot gen-
erate a secret between remote parties. One must find another mean to create a secret.
During the early 80s, Wiesner, Bennett, and Brassard had the idea to use quantum physics
to transmit secret information. Uncertainty is a fundamental property of quantum physics
that may be used in a positive manner to build quantum communication protocols. The
security level with quantum cryptography may be physically guaranteed up to any desired
level making it suitable for military or banking applications.
Quantum communication started growing in 1992 with the first prototype developed by
Bennett and Brassard over a 32cm free air link. Since then, many laboratories have worked
on quantum cryptography and now this technology has spread to industry.
Since its creation in 1995, the GTL-CNRS Telecom laboratory has studied quantum
cryptography, making it a pioneer in the field. Jean-Marc Merolla and Laurent Durrafourg
invented a quantum key distribution system that uses a single side band detection scheme
(SSB). This thesis focuses on this system and new developments on its security properties.
Moreover, it will also introduces a new single side pulse detection scheme (SSP) that inherits
the same security properties as the SSB. The use of both system with multiplexing leads to
an increase of the secure throughput.
Chapter 1 describes the evolution of classical cryptography systems and how the algo-
rithms are processed. Classical communications are analyzed using Shannon’s information
theory to define a security criterion for secure communications. The keystone for secure en-
cryption is to have a secure encryption seed. Quantum cryptography may solve this specific
problem and enable secret growing between remotes parties.
Chapter 2 explains several quantum key distribution protocols including the classical
BB84 protocol and their security strengths and weaknesses. One can then define a security
criterion to guarantee the generation of a secret communication key. This section also
includes the description of a strong reference in a quantum system as a security tool.
xiv
The SSB modulation scheme is described in Chapter 3, as well as the SSP system. This
section includes the implementation of the BB84 protocol for both systems. Moreover, this
specific system implements a strong reference which leads to a strong improvement in the
security when using a laser source. The security to that of a perfect single photon source.
The multiplexing of SSB and SSP is introduced to enhance the secure throughput.
Lastly, Chapter 4 describes the experimental implementation of the SSB principle for
quantum key distribution. The system enables long and stable transmission tests. Moreover,
an improvement of the system lead to an auto-compensation of the optical path fluctuations.
This makes the system robust over the physical variations of the fiber.
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Moreover, it will also introduces a new single side pulse detection scheme (SSP) that inherits
the same security properties as the SSB. The use of both system with multiplexing leads to
an increase of the secure throughput.
Chapter 1 describes the evolution of classical cryptography systems and how the algo-
rithms are processed. Classical communications are analyzed using Shannon’s information
theory to define a security criterion for secure communications. The keystone for secure en-
cryption is to have a secure encryption seed. Quantum cryptography may solve this specific
problem and enable secret growing between remotes parties.
Chapter 2 explains several quantum key distribution protocols including the classical
BB84 protocol and their security strengths and weaknesses. One can then define a security
criterion to guarantee the generation of a secret communication key. This section also
includes the description of a strong reference in a quantum system as a security tool.
The SSB modulation scheme is described in Chapter 3, as well as the SSP system. This
section includes the implementation of the BB84 protocol for both systems. Moreover, this
specific system implements a strong reference which leads to a strong improvement in the
security when using a laser source. The security to that of a perfect single photon source.
The multiplexing of SSB and SSP is introduced to enhance the secure throughput.
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Lastly, Chapter 4 describes the experimental implementation of the SSB principle for
quantum key distribution. The system enables long and stable transmission tests. Moreover,
an improvement of the system lead to an auto-compensation of the optical path fluctuations.




Transmitting encrypted messages appeared as early as ancient Roman times. The art of
war required secret transmission of orders to the battle field. The purpose of secret was
to hide the information if the messenger was caught by enemies. Modern uses also require
secure transmission means for military, diplomatic, and personal data. Encryption methods
have improved over time. Supercomputers and algorithmic improvements allow techniques
to break codes that were supposed to be unbreakable. For 25 years, a new way of securing
information has been developing, born by a marriage with physics and computer science1:
Quantum cryptography, and specifically quantum key distribution (QKD). The transmission
security of QKD relies on physical properties, not on purely mathematical concepts.
This chapter first describes the evolution of cryptography over time. Communicating
parties need to share an initial secure key for secrecy. Then, quantum cryptography is
introduced as a method for secret key distribution.
1.1 Cryptography and Information Theory
The word cryptography comes from cryptographia, a pseudo-Latin word invented during the
Middle Ages. It was coined from two Greek roots: the adjective κρυπτ òς (hidden) and the
noun γραφὴ (writing). It was the art of transforming plain messages into number strings.
The message transformation procedure has been developed especially since the 14th century.
It was called le nombre (the ”number”) [21]. Modern cryptography relies on mathematical
encoding techniques, known classical cryptography.
Cryptographic techniques were created in an empiric way. It was assumed that without
knowledge of the code, it would be impossible to decrypt a message. However, Information
1Bennett and Brassard, quantum cryptography inventors, first met October 1979 when they were both
swimming in Caribbean Islands. Quantum cryptography is born under the sun!
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theory, introduced by Shannon in 1948 [59], specifically quantified the information content
of a plain message. The notion of secret, or confidentiality, was then rigorously defined by
this.
This section explains some basic and more complex cryptographic systems. The role of
cryptographic keys for secret transmission between parties is described. Information theory
also formalizes the information content of any transmission and its secrecy.
1.1.1 Cryptography and Encryption Keys
Cryptography transforms an understandable plain message, often a written text, into an
encoded message, which only parties with a ”secret code” are able to decode and understand
clearly. The corresponding parties need to define a mean to transform a plain text into an
encrypted message and vice versa. Moreover, an eavesdropper that gains access to the
encrypted message is not able to easily recover the plain text. Cryptographic systems range
from very basic alphabetic substitution to more complex systems based on number theory.
Cryptographic applications are designed to ally easy and fast encoding and decoding when
the key is known. On the other hand, without knowledge of the key, it is almost impossibility
to decode the message.
1.1.1.1 Monoalphabetic Cryptographic Systems
A cryptographic system is defined as a set of all possible plain messages M, encrypted
messages C, and encryption keys K. It also includes encryption methods E and decryption
methods D. The symbolic format is the five-uplet (M, C,K, E ,D):
M = {plain messages x}
C = {encrypted messages y}
K = {keys k}
E = {ek : M → C|k ∈ K}
D = {dk : C → M|k ∈ K},
where ek and dk are the encryption and decryption functions. This system must meet the
following property: for all plain messages x in M and encryption keys k in K, the encrypted
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message y = ek(x) is in C and there exists a decryption key k−1 in K that allows decryption
of y:
∀x ∈ M,∀k ∈ K,∃k−1 ∈ K|dk−1(ek(x)) = x. (1)
A first set of basic cryptographic systems includes monoalphabetic systems. The most
simple of them are substitutions. Each letter is changed into its position in the alphabet,
see Figure 1. Each letter is always encoded into the same number. The symbolic definition
of substitution for a message of length n0 is the set (M, C,K, E ,D):
M = {a, b, c, d, ..., z}n0
C = {0, 1, 2, ..., 25}n0
K = {0}
E = {e0 : a 7→ 0, b 7→ 1, ...., z 7→ 25}
D = {d0 : 0 7→ a, 1 7→ b, ...., 25 7→ z}.
Figure 1: Encryption by Calvin and Hobbes [70]. The method used is a very basic alpha-
betic substitution. Homicidal Psycho Jungle Cat copyright ©1994 by Bill Watterson.
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Only one key is used in this cryptographic system. Thus, there is only one encryp-
tion function e0 and only one decryption function d0. An eavesdropper tapping in the
transmitted signal and knowing the encryption technique could decrypt the message. This
weakness is due to the single possible encryption key, i.e., card{K} = 1. This is an example
of Kerckhoffs’ principle [43], which states that secret should be included in the encryption
and decryption key, and not based on secrecy of the encoding technique, which cannot be
reasonably guaranteed.
More complex cryptographic systems are monoalphabetic systems. The encryption and
decryption shift the letter position in the alphabet. Thus, for a given shift n, the encryption
function maps a to n, b to n + 1, etc... The whole cryptographic system is then for an n0
length message:
M = {a, b, c, d, ..., z}n0
C = {0, 1, 2, ..., 25}n0
K = {0, 1, 2, ..., 25}
E = {en : a 7→ n, b 7→ n+ 1, ...., z 7→ n+ 25}
D = {dn : n 7→ a, n+ 1 7→ b, ...., n+ 25 7→ z},
where the corresponding number addition is always modulo 26. In this system, the encryp-
tion key is the shift value n. There are thus, 26 possible keys, card{K} = 26.
Finally, the most general substitution is based on assigning randomly a value to a letter,
then constructing a substitution table from this. The number of possible keys is then the
number of possible permutations of the set {0, 1, ..., 25}, card{K} = 26! ≈ 4 · 1026 possible
keys. Although this number looks very large, the major weakness of this system is the single
encoding for each letter. When an eavesdropper knows the initial language, a statistical
attack on an encrypted message can recover the substitution table, and thus decrypt the
message [58].
A complex cryptographic system must encrypt a specific letter as a function of the
surrounding characters, which is as a function of the context. As basic substitutions are
not enough, polyalphabetic systems need to be developed.
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1.1.1.2 Alphabetic Polysubstitution
Following Kerckhoffs’ principle, one needs to build a system where the encryption key
number is very large, i.e., card{K} ≫ 1, and where the knowledge of one encrypted message
does not allow direct attacks. A ”brute force” attack, which is to try all possible keys,
should not be possible directly and practical. Polysubstitution alphabetic systems have
been developed to increase the number of possible encryption keys.
The Enigma machine is an example of polysubstitution alphabetic system. It was ac-
tively used by Germans during World War II. It scrambles plain text letters with an electro-
mechanical apparatus, see Figure 2. Initial text is entered through a keyboard with keys
scrambled by a wiring panel that switches letters two by two. Then, three moving rotors
scramble the electrical signal again. It is reflected again through the rotors and the wiring
panel. Finally the letters appear on a light bulb array, see Figure 2(b). A mechanical sys-
tem shifts the rotors’ position after every encoded letter. Each letter match depends on
both the initial key and its position in the message. Thus, the encryption key is the rotors’
initial position and the wiring of the connection panel.
(a) The Enigma machine. (b) Turing’s note on Enigma [67].
Figure 2: The Enigma machine.
The number of possible encryption keys for Enigma was above 1016, making brute
force attacks impossible. With this large number of possibilities, and without computer
technology in 1940, the Germans were fully confident in their cryptographic apparatus2.
Though, Benchley Park’s English cryptanalysts tasked specifically to the study of this
2A brute force attack would take only a few minutes with today’s computer.
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machine, managed to crack the code. They used its weaknesses, such as its symmetric
characteristics. The English were able, thanks to Turing [67], to decrypt German messages
in an efficient ways.
1.1.1.3 Computational Complexity, Easy and Complex Codes
The difficulty to attack a system may be evaluated by its computational complexity. An
algorithm complexity is the number of required steps as a function of the input size, i.e.,
the length of the message to study. For example, searching a magnetic tape is of linear
complexity, as one need to read the whole tape once. A dictionary search is logarithmic,
as one need to check the word in the middle of the book, and then proceed to a search in
a ”half-size dictionary”. This is also known as ”divide and conquer”. Simple problems are
those of polynomial complexity, and complex problems are of exponential complexity3.
Since the 1950s, computing power has drastically increased. As result, new encryption
methods have been developed. Mathematical properties based on number theory are use-
ful tools for cryptography, and its counterpart, cryptanalysis. Computers allow long and
repetitive calculation to be done efficiently. The limiting factor is then the required time
for an exhaustive computer search. One solution to overcome the effectiveness of increasing
computing power is to increase the system size and the key size, thus increasing the number
of possible encryption and decryption keys.
1.1.1.4 Symmetric Algorithm: The AES code
A symmetric encryption scheme is an algorithm where encryption and decryption are the
same operations. One of them is the AES code, also known as ”Rijndael”4 [20]. It was
developed by two Belgian cryptographers, Daemen and Rijmen. Initially defined as an
encryption standard by the US government and adopted November 2001 by the National
Institute of Standards (NIST), this method is today widely used.
3One could say that an easy problem could be solved by the computing power of your younger sister and
a complex problem requires an NSA Cray X1.
4If you’re Dutch, Flemish, Indonesian, Surinamer or South-African, it’s pronounced like you think it
should be. Otherwise, you could pronounce it like ”Reign Dahl”, ”Rain Doll”, ”Rhine Dahl”. I’m not picky.
As long as you make it sound different from ”Region Deal”.
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The AES algorithm is a network of substitutions and permutations. It is easy to build,
fast when implemented in software or hardware, and requires low amount of memory. It
is a block sequential code where different basic operation steps are processed, see Figure 3.
The key ⊕ is a bitwise XOR between the key and the text, e.g., 66⊕fa 7→ 9c. The ”S-Box”
step is a non-linear process that uses a matching table, between plain bytes and encrypted
bytes, e.g., 9c 7→ a2. The line shift is processed by shifting lines by two bytes for the second
line, three bytes for the third line, and six bytes for the last line. The column scrambling
is represented by a matrix product of mij elements in the Galois field GF (2
8) with one
column5. These operations are repeated nine times and use a different key for each pass.















Figure 3: AES code scheme.
There is today no known successful attack on the AES algorithm. Its security has
been judged efficient enough by US government to use as a TOP SECRET level encryption
method. Even though some cryptanalysts worry about AES security and its mathemat-
ical structure, it is much more complex than many block cryptography algorithms. In
September 2002, Courtois and Pieprzyk [18] announced a thrilling attack on AES which
5A multiplication description in a Galois field may be found in [29].
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reveals a potential weakness in the algorithm. Although it requires computing power far
more advanced than is available today, the needed technology may be available in a near
future. Moreover, some cryptographers criticize mathematical grounds of this paper, and
the calculations specifically.
In all previous examples, the emitter and the receiver have access to an encryption
and a decryption key respectively, on which they agree before the transmission. These are
called secret key systems. The keys have to remain secret to guarantee the secrecy of the
transmission. This is where the paradox lies: one must share an initial secret before having
a secret transmission. Though, it is possible to implement encryption algorithms that are
today unbreakable.
1.1.2 Classical Information and Security
Information theory introduced by Shannon in 1948 [59] defines the information bit in a
digital communication. One can then calculate the amount of information per transmitted
symbol. In 1949 Shannon worked also with cryptanalysts to publish an application of this
theory6 towards the formalism of secret communication information [60].
This section presents how information theory describes cryptographic systems and links
security to encryption keys. It shows that secrecy requires secret encryption keys.
1.1.2.1 Cryptographic System and Perfect Secrecy
Shannon showed that any cryptosystem may be modeled as Figure 4. The plain message
x is encrypted into the cryptogram y = ek1(x). The message is found back by decryption,
x = dk2(y) = dk2(ek1(x)). In order to make the system solvable, we should consider that
the encryption/decryption system is known by any eavesdropper, i.e., he/she knows all en-
cryption ek and decryption dk functions, as well as the probability distribution for the key
k within K. The assumption is part of the Kerckhoffs’ rules [43].
The ”theoretical security” of a cryptosystem may be considered when an enemy is as-
sured to have access to unlimited time and computing power. A cryptosystem is considered
6The content of this paper published in 1949 appear in a confidential report dated September 1st, 1946














Key k1 Key k2
Cryptanalysis
Enemy
Figure 4: Schematic of a cryptosystem.
to have perfect secrecy when the a posteriori probability to know the plain text x when
knowing the encrypted message y is the same as the a priori probability to know the text
x:
∀x ∈ M, y ∈ C,Prob(x/y) = Prob(x). (2)
Shannon shows that to achieve perfect secrecy, it requires the amount of possible keys to
be at least as large as the amount of possible messages [60], i.e.,
card(K) ≥ card(M). (3)
1.1.2.2 One Time Pad Encryption Technique
One example of such system presenting as many possible messages, as many possible keys is
the one-time pad encryption scheme. It meets perfect secrecy requirement of Equation (2).
A random encryption key, as lengthy as the message itself, is used once and then changed
for each following transmission. Encryption is made by an XOR operation between the key
and the plain message. The decryption method is the exact same operation; an XOR of the
encrypted text with the key gives the plain message back. This technique initially described
by Vernam [68] at the beginning of the twentieth century guarantees that an eavesdropper
reading the encrypted message derive absolutely no information on the plain message using
the encrypted message.
An example of one time pad use is the communication between Fidel Castro and Che
Guevara, see Figure 5. The initial text is transformed through a mapping table to give
the message M . The message is added modulo 10 to the encryption key k, known only by
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Che Guevara and Fidel Castro, to give the cryptogram y that may then be transmitted in
a public manner to Castro by radio signal for example. The same operation on y allows
recovery of the plain message x. Security of such a system relies on the private sharing of








Figure 5: One Time Pad scheme example between Che Guevara et Fidel Castro. Note
found on Che Guevara during his arrestation by Bolivian military. The Spanish text says:
”...informe oral que le di...” meaning: ”...the oral report I gave him...”
1.1.2.3 Authentication and Identification
All cryptographic applications work when the message has not been modified or replaced.
A key must be transmitted from the emitter to the receiver and must fulfill two conditions.
The first condition is to make sure that the key has not been modified during transmission
-a process called authentication- to guarantee message integrity. The emitter and receiver,
usually called Alice and Bob7, must also trust the other party, this is called identification.
They can then check the origin of a message anytime.
When identification is used, it is then impossible for an eavesdropper to perform a man-
in-the-middle attack which consists in spoofing both Alice and Bob by pretending to be
Alice to Bob and to be Bob to Alice.
Identification may be performed first by considering that Alice and Bob share a common
7Schneier introduced a table of dramatis personae headed by Alice and Bob [58]. Others include Carol
(a participant in three- and four-party protocols), Dave (a participant in four-party protocols), Eve (an
eavesdropper), Mallory (a malicious active attacker), Trent (a trusted arbitrator), Walter (a warden), Peggy
(a prover) and Victor (a verifier). These names for roles are either already standard or, given the wide
popularity of the book, may be expected to quickly become so.
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secret: a password that they exchange at the beginning of each communication. Needham
and Guy showed that Alice and Bob do not need to know the other’s actual password,
but that they only need to be able to differentiate a valid password from an invalid one.
Then, only results from hashing functions of passwords are compared. This prevents an
eavesdropper to recover the initial password.
Authentication may also be implemented with hashing functions. A initial secret key is
used to sign a document, validating the message non-alteration during transmission.
All previous processes require an initial secret to be shared between Alice and Bob. Its
length is to be the logarithm of the message length. For example, if Alice and Bob share a
secret of length n0, they may be able to sign a message of lengths no greater than e
n0 to
guarantee integrity of the message [58].
1.1.3 From Mathematical Strength to Physics Power
Encryption and decryption with prefect secrecy is achievable by using the one time pad
scheme. Though, one must transmit the key from Alice to Bob in a secure fashion first.
Another class of algorithms was developed, the public key cryptosystems. These allow
one-way secure transmission over a public channel guaranteed on mathematical properties.
The typical scheme of such system is to publish a bit string A, the public key, that allows
one to encrypt a message, such that only the authorized receiver may decrypt the message
with the corresponding private key B, with the private key B being only known by the
receiver. In the same fashion, a public key A may allow one to decrypt messages that only
the legitimate sender can encrypt with the private key B.
The security of such system relies on mathematical properties or unproven conjectures.
One should note that in case of a conjecture, the security of the communication is not 100%
guaranteed as a genius may have already found a way to disprove this conjecture, but has
not yet published it.
1.1.3.1 Public Key System: RSA Code
An example of such system is the globally used RSA code, named from its three inventor’s
name Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman [56]. It is a symmetric scheme, i.e.,
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encryption ek and decryption dk functions are the same ones. Let us assume an integer n to
be the product of two large prime numbers p and q. The crypto system may be described
by:
M = Z/nZ and C = Z/nZ
K = {e invertible in Z/ϕ(n)Z}
E = {ek : m 7→ mk (modulo n)}
D = {dk : c 7→ ck (modulo n)}
where Z/nZ is the group of integers modulo n and ϕ(n) is the Euler indicator [29]. Messages
are described modulo n and encryption and decryption functions are proceed with powers
modulo n. A decryption key k ∈ K is associated to a decryption key d ∈ K which is
the inverse8 of e ∈ K in Z/ϕ(n)Z. The secret pair (e, d) allows the recovery of encrypted
messages [29].
If an eavesdropper intercepts the public key (n, e), and the encrypted message y, she
cannot directly access the number d that is kept secret. Eve must compute p and q from
n in order to compute ϕ(n), and then d from e. There exists no known algorithm allowing
one to factorize the product of two large prime numbers in logarithmic complexity using a
classical computer9. It is also not yet proven that factorizing n is the best way to crack
RSA. In any case, one can consider this algorithm to be secure enough for the present, but
encrypted messages may be recorded now and decrypted in the future when a new technique
will be available.
This algorithm, as well as all public key algorithms, has a strong weakness; it is slow
-much slower than its symmetric counterpart. For large data applications, public key algo-
rithms can not be used economically. A solution is to use hybrid systems. First encryption
keys are exchanged with an asymmetric public key algorithm, and second a symmetric al-
gorithm is used for the data encryption. The well known Pretty Good Privacy10 (PGP)
8An algorithm for finding an inverse modulo n may be found in Schneier [58].
9We should say: we do not know today such a classical algorithm. Though, Peter Shor found an efficient
algorithm to factorize a product of two primes on a quantum computer [61].
10The name ”Pretty Good Privacy” was inspired by the name of the grocery store featured in radio host
Garrison Keillor’s fictional town, Lake Wobegon. The grocery was ”Ralph’s Pretty Good Grocery”.
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originally designed and developed by Phil Zimmermann in 1991, widely used to encrypt
emails, is built on this scheme.
1.1.3.2 Brute Force or Exhaustive Attack
Confusion may occur with the word ”attack” from its different definitions. For a cryptog-
rapher, an attack is any process that allows one to find the key faster than an exhaustive
attack, even if completely unpractical. For an engineer, an attack is something practical
now, or that may be at least implemented in a near future. For example, an algorithm
could be a possible attack for a cryptographer, as it lowers the complexity of the algorithm,
but still not an engineer.
A brute force attack is an exhaustive trial of all possible keys on a cryptosystem. It
is brutal in a sense that it requires no ”thinking”, only systematic trials of every possible
key. Such an attack has become possible by using distributed resources. RSA labs launched
a challenge to find the encryption key of a short encrypted message. The distributed.net
team found the 56 bit key on October 19th, 1997 at 1:25pm UTC.
One must then strongly secure the key transmission, and one should be able to change
this key quite often. The previous described techniques rely on mathematical conjectures
where encryption algorithm complexity guarantees the transmission security. Moreover
these systems may be retroactively attacked. New methods have to be found to have secure
communication, and to guarantee absolute security. Using one time pad encryption scheme,
one can guarantee the security of key transmission.
1.2 QKD: From the BB84 Protocol to strong reference pro-
tocol
Quantum physics may look counter-intuitive in a macroscopic world, and especially its
uncertainty principle. Though, as its laws may not be broken, it is possible to use them
to guarantee transmission absolute security. Quantum physics allows the development of a
new field, quantum cryptography, where security relies on physical properties and laws.
Quantum cryptography was born around 1970 from an idea of Wiesner [73], and from
Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [7]. The following quantum principles sustain quantum
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cryptography:
1. It is impossible to perfectly copy an unknown quantum state. This principle is also
known as the non-cloning theorem [74].
2. Any measurement disturbs the system.
3. Measurements are probabilistic.
The first property illustrates a fundamental principle in quantum physics: uncertainty. If
one desires to proceed to two simultaneous non orthogonal measurements on a quantum
particle, the results will remain uncertain. The second property shows the sensitive char-
acter of quantum particles. Uncertainty in quantum physics allows one to build quantum
communication protocols. These two properties allow one to check if an eavesdropper is
tapping the signal, thus also disturbing the quantum signal between Alice and Bob.
Historically, the first described protocol, the BB84 [7], uses orthogonal quantum mea-
surement to construct a key sharing between Alice and Bob. Then, protocols have evolved
and use more complex measurements, the POVM described in Section 1.2.2. Finally, quan-
tum information processing allows one to build more complex schemes using EPR states,
squeezed states, or continuous quantum variables.
This section describes the main protocols evolution. Different quantum state prepara-
tions and measurements can be used to build a secret communication scheme that guarantees
the confidentiality of such communications.
1.2.1 Orthogonal Quantum Measurement and BB84 Protocol
1.2.1.1 Quantum States and Bra-ket
Quantum cryptography uses quantum particles to carry information, more specifically the
value of a state variable. Such a variable may be modeled in a Hermitian space E. One
specific state may be described with a state vector called ket and written |ψ〉 ∈ E. This
space E comes with a scalar product 〈ϕ|ψ〉 where |ψ〉 belongs to E and 〈ϕ| belongs to
E∗, the dual space of E. 〈ϕ| ∈ E∗ is called bra, and its scalar product is called braket.
The bra-ket satisfies the properties of a Hermitian scalar product, i.e., ∀λ1, λ2 ∈ C and
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∀ϕ1, ϕ2, ψ1, ψ2, ϕ, ψ ∈ E:
〈λ1ϕ1 + λ2ϕ2|ψ〉 = λ∗1〈ϕ1|ψ〉 + λ∗2〈ϕ2|ψ〉 and
〈ϕ|λ1ψ1 + λ2ψ2〉 = λ1〈ϕ|ψ1〉 + λ2〈ϕ|ψ2〉 (sesquilinearity)
〈ψ|ψ〉 ∈ R+ (positivity)
(〈ψ|ψ〉 = 0) ⇒ (|ψ〉 = |0〉) (definite)
Hermitian spaces considered for quantum cryptography are usually two dimensional.
The first quantum key distribution implementation [6] used photon polarization as the
quantum variable. It considers two rectilinear, orthogonal, and same amplitude photon po-
larizations, |u〉 and |v〉, that generates an orthonormal basis B. For all photon polarization
states |ψ〉 of same amplitude as state |u〉, one can find a, b ∈ C such as this state is a linear
combination of basis B vectors:
|ψ〉 = a|u〉 + b|v〉. (4)
This decomposition fulfills the following condition for unit photon state |ψ〉:
‖ |ψ〉 ‖2= |a|2 + |b|2 = 1. (5)
1.2.1.2 Quantum Variable or qubit
It is possible to define a qubit11 (or quantum bit) used in quantum information processing.
Contrary to regular bits that can have only two possible value (often written 0 and 1), a
qubit may have a continuum of values of form a|0〉+b|1〉 where a and b satisfy Equation (5).
A qubit, or state |ψ〉 = a|u〉+ b|v〉, may be represented by a point (θ, φ) on the unit sphere,
called Bloch sphere, see Figure 6. Angles θ and φ are defined by:
a = cos(θ/2), (6)
b = eiφ sin(θ/2), (7)
where a is a real, that may be obtained by multiplying |ψ〉 by a phase factor, which is not
observable. Then |ψ〉 is represented with a unitary vector (cosφ sin θ, sinφ sin θ, cos θ) called
Bloch vector.






Figure 6: Qubit or state vector |ψ〉 representation on the Bloch sphere.
When a quantum state |ψ〉 is prepared, there are two ways to measure the value of
this variable. The first method, introduced by von Neumann [69], is the standard quantum
measure, also called orthogonal measure or Neumann measure. The second way, the measure
with POVM, is described in Section 1.2.2.
1.2.1.3 Orthogonal Quantum Measurement
The measure of a measureable physical length P, may be described with a Hermitian oper-
ator P of E, called measurement. This measurement is an autoadjoint endomorphism [29],
that satisfies P ∗ = P , its eigenvalues λn are real, and its eigenvector set {|un〉}n spans an
orthonormal basis of E. Assuming Pn to be the orthogonal projection on vector |un〉, Pn
and P may be expressed as:








When a measurement P is applied to a vector |ψ〉, quantum mechanics imposes that
the outcome of the measurement is one of the eigenvectors |un〉 with a probability pn:
pn = ‖〈un|ψ〉‖2 = 〈ψ|un〉〈un|ψ〉 = 〈ψ|Pn|ψ〉. (10)









Pn|ψ〉 = 〈ψ|P |ψ〉 = ‖P |ψ〉‖2 = 1, (11)
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because P is Hermitian, thus, it conserves norms on E. The initial state |ψ〉 becomes with




Any measurement P projects any state |ψ〉 on one of its eigenstates |un〉 with a prob-
ability 1/
√
pn. Contrary to the classical case, measurement is probabilistic. Unless the
system was previously in one of the eigenstates of the observable, the system is modified by
measurements.
1.2.1.4 The BB84 Protocol
The first quantum cryptography protocol introduced by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 uses
orthogonal projections and Neumann measurement, hence its acronym BB84 [7]. Initially
described with photon polarization, this protocol may be used with any quantum state
variable.
Alice and Bob initially use four states |u1〉, |u2〉, |v1〉, |v2〉, from a two dimension Hermi-
tian space, satisfying:
〈u1|u2〉 = 〈v1|v2〉 = 0, (13)




BU = {|u0〉, |u1〉} andBV = {|v0〉, |v1〉} are orthonormal bases ofE. Moreover, Equation (14)








The four BB84 protocol states may be represented on the Bloch sphere, see Figure 7.
As |u0〉 and |u1〉 are orthogonal, it is possible to build a measurement MU that gives
a deterministic outcome for these two states, see Figure 8(a). In the same manner, it is
possible to build MV in order to separate |v0〉 and |v1〉, see Figure 8(b). One can then note









Figure 7: The four states associated with BB84 protocol.
(a) Measurement MU , projection
on |u0〉 and |u1〉.
(b) Measurement MV , projection
on |v0〉 and |v1〉.
Figure 8: Orthogonal Measurement Representation of MU et MV built from initial vectors
|u0〉, |u1〉, |v0〉, |v1〉.
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The probability to detect a state |ψ〉 on an eigenstate |ϕ〉 depends on the angle θ between
the two states. The corresponding probability is p = cos2 θ.
To build a communication protocol, Alice and Bob assign bit value 0 to states |u0〉 and
|v0〉 and bit value 1 to states |u1〉 and |v1〉. When Bob applies the proper measurement on
a quantum state |ψ〉, i.e., the one built from the state |ψ〉, he can determine the sent state
exactly. A contrario, if he applies the wrong measurement, the outcome is random because
of the 1/2 probability for each.
The BB84 protocol uses the following steps:
1. Alice randomly prepares a state |ψ〉 among the four possible values and sends it to
Bob. The random character of basis choice is here fundamental. The basis choice is
a random, independent, and equiprobable process.
2. Bob receives the state |ψ〉 and applies a measurement MU or MV chosen randomly,
i.e., he makes a projection on one of the bases U or V .
3. After the measurement is performed, Bob reveals to Alice on an authenticated public
channel the bases he used.
4. Alice and Bob conserve only bits corresponding to states prepared and measured in
the same bases.
The whole process, with all possible states and measurements, is summarized in Table 1.
Finally, Alice and Bob share a random bit string that may be used as a seed for an encryption
key and more complex classical cryptography algorithms.
Table 1: All possible BB84 protocol prepared states and measurements.
Bit 0 1 0 1
Base U U V V
Alice State |u0〉 |u1〉 |v0〉 |v1〉
Bob Measurement MU MV MU MV MU MV MU MV







Same Basis Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Shared Bit 0 1 0 1
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1.2.1.5 The B92 Protocol
Charles Bennett showed in 1992 that a quantum key distribution protocol may be built with
only two non orthogonal states using orthogonal measurements, called the B92 protocol [5].
Two non orthogonal states |u〉 and |v〉 are associated with two measurements Mū and
Mv̄ which are orthogonal to |u〉 and |v〉 respectively Then, when these measurements are
applied to initial states:
Mū|u〉 = 0 and Mū|v〉 > 0 (16)
Mv̄|v〉 = 0 and Mv̄|u〉 > 0. (17)
Bob randomly chooses one of either measurement. When he has a non-zero outcome, he
can recover the sent state.
This protocol may be explained with positive operator valued measurements (POVM)
as described below.
1.2.2 POVM Measurement and B92 protocol
1.2.2.1 The POVM or non-Orthogonal Measurement
The second way to perform a quantum measurement is with Positive Operator Valued
Measurement (POVM) [10]. Assume two non orthogonal states |u〉 and |v〉, such that
〈u|v〉 = cos θ 6= 0. The state |v〉 may be decomposed as:
|v〉 = cos θ|u〉 + sin θ|ū〉, (18)
where |ū〉 is the orthogonal vector to |ū〉 that satisfies Equation (18).
The POVM may be described with a series of three non negative operators:
Pū =
1− |u〉〈u|
1 + 〈u|v〉 (19)
Pv̄ =
1− |v〉〈v|
1 + 〈u|v〉 (20)
P? = 1− Pū − Pū (21)
where Pū and Pv̄ are projectors on subspaces orthogonal to |u〉 and |v〉 respectively.
This POVM may be decomposed by first building the operators Pū and Pv̄ to void states
|u〉 and |v〉. The operator P? is then added for the sum to equal 1, the identity operator.
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The probability to detect P|ū〉|v〉 and P|v̄〉|u〉, and the third outcome P? are respectively:
p|ū〉 = ‖ P|ū〉|v〉 ‖= 〈v|PūPū|v〉 = 〈v|Pū|v〉
=
〈v|(1− |u〉〈u|)|v〉
1 + cos θ
=
1 − cos2 θ
1 + cos θ
= 1 − cos θ (22)
p|v̄〉 = 〈u|Pv̄|u〉 =
1 − cos2 θ
1 + cos θ
= 1 − cos θ (23)
p? = 〈v|P?|v〉
=
〈v|(−1 + |u〉〈v| + |u〉〈u| + |v〉〈v|)|v〉
1 + cos θ
= cos θ (24)
Then, one can observe that p|ū〉 + p? = 1 and p|v̄〉 + p? = 1
The probability to have a positive value detection p|ū〉 or p|ū〉 is not 1, the result is not
always conclusive. A POVM allows one to know with a probability 0 < p < 1 if the state
is not colinear to |u〉. Though, when the outcome is null, it is impossible to conclude if the
detected state was |u〉 or |v〉.
The non orthogonal measure with POVM allows knowing from time to time the state
of an incoming state. Quantum Key Distribution Protocols may be built using orthogonal
measurements like the BB84, but also non-orthogonal states as done in the B92.
1.2.2.2 The B92 Protocol
Two non orthogonal states are enough to build a QKD protocol. B92 protocol, initially
described with orthogonal measurement by Bennett [5], may also be described with POVM
measurement as follows.
Let us consider two non-orthogonal states |u〉 and |v〉, and the angle θ between these
two states, i.e., 〈v|u〉 = cos θ > 0, see Figure 9.
The B92 protocol relies on the non orthogonality of the two states |u〉 and |v〉. Alice and
Bob assign bit value 0 for |u〉, and bit value 1 for |v〉. Any operator may not discriminate
these two states.
The B92 protocol is processed in a similar fashion as the BB84:
1. Alice chooses a bit 0 or 1 to be sent, prepares the corresponding state |u〉 or |v〉, and








Figure 10: B92 POVM representation in the Bloch Sphere.
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2. Bob applies the POVM described with the Equations (19-21).
3. Bob tells Alice on a public channel the states for which he has a positive outcome.
4. Alice and Bob keep only the corresponding bits.
It is also possible to build a table with states prepared by Alice and the measurement
performed by Bob.
Table 2: All B92 states and measurements.
Bit to be sent 0 1
Alice state |u〉 |v〉
POVM outcome Pū Pv̄ P? Pū Pv̄ P?
Detection Probability 0 1 − cos θ cos θ 1 − cos θ 0 cos θ
Shared Bit Alice-Bob No bit 0 No bit 1 No bit No bit
The B92 protocol uses two vectors that may not be 100% separated, and BB84 uses two
vector bases where vectors may be perfectly discriminated. It relies on a smaller number of
states than the BB84, that makes it easier to build a prototype implementation. Moreover,
there is no need of bases discussion, as Bob may determine directly what bit was sent when
he has a positive outcome. The protocol is slower, however, as Bob may not obtain a useful
result even when he chooses a measurement that could give him a positive outcome.
1.2.3 EPR, Squeezed States, and Continuous Variable Protocols
1.2.3.1 EPR states protocol
Ekert has described a cryptographic scheme in which Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs
of particles [23]. are used to generate identical random numbers in remote places [24],
while Bell’s theorem certifies that the particles have not been measured in transit by an
eavesdropper. Bennet described a related but simpler EPR scheme [8] and, without invoking
Bell’s theorem, proved its security against more general attacks, including substitution of a
fake EPR source. This scheme is equivalent to the BB84 which uses single particles instead
of EPR pairs.
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1.2.3.2 Continuous Variable and Squeezed States Protocols
New quantum key distribution protocols types include light signals with much higher am-
plitude than single photon level energy. Homodyne detection is then used to measure the
information of an electromagnetic mode quadratures. It is then possible to transmit a secret
key with quasi-classical states [30, 31].
Schemes have been proposed using squeezed states [36, 28, 16]. In these schemes, the
states are squeezed in one of two field quadrature components, and the value of the squeezed
component is used to encode a character from an alphabet. The uncertainty relation be-
tween quadrature components prevents an eavesdropper from determining both with enough
precision to determine the character being sent.
1.2.3.3 The 4+2: Combination of Advantages
The 4+2 protocol introduced by Huttner [40] presents advantages from both the two and
four state protocols. By choosing non-orthogonal states, Alice and Bob take advantage of
the two state protocol. That is, Eve may not differentiate in a deterministic way the two
states of each basis.
The security of such a principle is based on two fundamental properties: The basis choice have to be completely hidden from the other party and from another
Eavesdropper on the channel. When Alice and Bob use different bases, their bits are completely independent in a
probabilistic manner.
The first property ensures that any eavesdropper that does not know the used basis will
inevitably introduce errors in the transmission.
Though, this is necessary to verify conditions (5) and (13) as well as the condition:
〈u0|u1〉 = 〈v0|v1〉 = cos θ > 0 (25)
thus, θ < π/2, and states from a same basis are in the same meridian plan in the Bloch
sphere. An example of four states complying with these conditions is shown in Figure 11.








Figure 11: 4+2 Protocol states position in the Bloch Sphere.
(a) First POVM used to differentiate
|u0〉 and |u1〉.
(b) Second POVM used to differenti-
ate |v0〉 and |v1〉.
Figure 12: 4+2 Protocol POVM to distinguish same basis states.
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1.2.3.4 SARG Protocol
One can also notice the existence of the SARG protocol [57, 1], developed by Acin, Scarani
et al. This protocol differs from the original protocol by Bennett and Brassard (BB84) only
in the classical sifting procedure. This protocol is provably better than the BB84 against
the photon number splitting (PNS) attacks at zero error. Though, we will consider in this
dissertation only hardware means to avoid the PNS attack.
1.3 Conclusion
Cryptography systems, developed over history, allow one to transmit secure data using
encryption and decryption problem. Symmetric encryption schemes are fast and efficient
and show a great security, as long as the encryption key is long enough and kept secret.
If this key is as long as the message, the one time pad scheme may be applied for perfect
security. Though, the secure key transmission problem between Alice and Bob remains.
In order to transmit securely the encryption key, public key algorithms make one part
of the process publicly available, either encryption or decryption. Only people with the
private key may proceed to the second part of the transmission, decryption or encryption
respectively. These algorithms rely on mathematical conjectures, e.g., the difficulty to
factorize the product of two large primes. Asymmetric algorithms are often slow. Moreover,
a security threat remains as they are not 100% proven yet.
Quantum cryptography solves this problem and allows secure key transmission. Secu-
rity of such a transmission is based on physical principles, not on mathematical conjectures.
An additional security of such system is that transmissions may not be recorded and at-
tacked a posteriori, because quantum transmission have the evanescent property that allows
enhanced security.
Many quantum key distribution protocols exist, including the BB84 or the B92 protocol.
We will study the theoretical security of such protocols, as well as the implementation of a
prototype using a strong reference detection. A prototype will be implemented and tested
in order to check its performance regarding data rate and security with respect to different
attacks, and maximum reachable transmission distance between emitter and receiver.
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CHAPTER II
INFORMATION, SECURITY, AND QUANTUM
CRYPTOGRAPHY
Quantum key distribution solves a problem that classical cryptography cannot, i.e., secret
growing between two remote parties, usually called Alice and Bob. The uncertainty principle
of quantum physics is used to guarantee that no eavesdropper is tampering with the signal
during the transmission. Quantum key distribution includes two main steps: the quantum
preparation, transmission, and measurement of particles first and the classical reconciliation
step second. This last step is a public discussion on a classical channel between Alice and
Bob to extract a final key from the quantum discussion.
The non-cloning theorem [74] is the main tool used to prove security of a quantum key
distribution system. It prevents any eavesdropper to listen to the quantum transmission
without creating errors and remaining unnoticed. Imperfect devices may also introduce
errors in the transmission, typically 10% of the bit string. To avoid any confusion with the
error rate in classical communication, which is typically of the order of 10−9, Beat Perny
from Swisscom and Paul Townsend from British Telecom proposed to call the quantum
transmission error rate, QBER, for quantum bit error rate [25].
To show secrecy for real transmission systems, we consider the worst case scenario: the
observed QBER is assuming to be solely due to an eavesdropper. This spy is usually called
Eve. She has access to perfect technology and complies to physical laws. Information may
have leaked during the quantum transmission and error correction that Eve may have retain.
A QKD protocol is then defined as being secure [52] if for any security parameter ξ > 0 and
η > 0, Eve’s mutual information with the final key, IEve, is less than ξ with a probability
1 −O(η). In other term, one can achieve the following criterion:
Prob (IEve > ξ) < η. (26)
30
The purpose of this chapter is to show how QKD protocols, and more precisely QKD
systems with laser sources may comply to the condition of Equation (26). The classical
communication step between Alice and Bob to extract a final secure key is described in
Section 2.1. Then, Section 2.2 studies attacks on the quantum communication step when
Eve has access to perfect technology. Finally, the security of imperfect single photon sources
is addressed in Section 2.3 and the use of a strong reference to prevent security threat is
also discussed.
2.1 Classical Step and Secret Key
The quantum key distribution initial phase is the quantum transmission and basis disclo-
sure to keep only correlated bits between Alice and Bob, see Section 1.2. Upon successful
completion, they share a key of N bits, see Figure 13. With perfect systems, their keys
are strictly identical. However, practical imperfections lead to errors between both keys.
Alice and Bob proceed to a comparison to evaluate the QBER with a public authenticated
channel. Then, they implement an error correction to produce two identical keys between
them. In the most adverse case, Eve can replace the imperfect channel with a lossless error
free channel and attacks the bits. As per the physics law, these observation introduce a
disturbance and thus errors. These errors are completely due to Eve. Then, Alice and Bob
apply privacy amplification to lower Eve’s information to a level that can be arbitrarily
small, see Figure 13.
This process may be stopped after QBER evaluation. If it is too high, Alice and Bob
may decide to stop communication as the eavesdropper may retrieve enough information
that prevents a secure communication.
Finally, quantum key distribution systems practical security depends on the desired
security level, i.e., the acceptable assumptions that are made regarding today’s technology.















Raw Key (N bits)
Private Key (n bits)
Final Secret Key (n− τ bits)
Figure 13: Quantum Key Distribution General Procedure Description. The three steps are
1) Quantum Communication and Reconciliation, 2) Comparison and Error Correction and
3) Privacy Amplification to have a final secret key.
2.1.1 Errors, Correction, and QBER
2.1.1.1 Public Comparison
The purpose of comparison is to give an error rate approximation between Alice’s and Bob’s
bit strings. This step is performed with a public channel and breaks into three steps, see
Figure 14: Random choice by Alice of key part to be compared KA1. Public exchange of the key part KA1 between Alice and Bob. Error rate computing by direct comparison using the public channel.
Raw Key
Compared Key part KA1
Cleaned Key KA2
Figure 14: Different parts used in public key comparison.
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The error rate of one part will be representative of the error rate of the other part with
a very high probability. The error rate approximation quality depends on the amount of
bit in KA1. Suppose the key is broken into two random parts. Using [64], and assuming
a key of length N , KA1, KA2, KB1 and KB2 the two key parts from Alice and Bob, and
d(K1,K2) the amount of errors between the two bit strings K1 and K2, it is then possible


















Then the remaining part quantum bit error rate is approximated by:
QBERapprox = N/d(K1,K2). (28)
The amount of key to compare must be both low enough not to disclose too much of
the key, and high enough to guarantee a good approximation of error rate and to adapt the
error correction process.
To defeat an eavesdropper attack, the random choice of key KA1 must be done a poste-
riori of quantum transmission. Otherwise, Eve could then observe the remaining key part
(KA2) without creating errors on the first part. The QBER estimation would be completely
erroneous, preventing the process to be secure.
2.1.1.2 Error Correction
Error correction corrects errors on KA2 and KB2 keys to produce an identical key between
Alice and Bob. They use a public channel to transmit information on the keys structures,
called syndromes, than can locate and correct errors. The initial knowledge of the error
rate is a crucial point for an efficient process.
We assume that each bit is transmitted independently with an error probability, QBER.
The minimum amount of bits, r, that Alice and Bob need to exchange on the public channel
to correct their errors is given by Shannon’s coding theorem [72]. It satisfies:
r = n [−QBER log2(QBER) − (1 − QBER) log2(1 − QBER)] . (29)
Shannon’s proof does not give explicit error correction methods. Bennett and Salvail de-



































Figure 15: Parity Block Error Correction Cascade Protocol Principle. The key is split into
l length blocks, and parities p1, p2, p3, ..., pn are computed. A hatched block shows different
parity between Alice and Bob. Blocks are kept without the parity bit, and scrambled with
M1. The process is renewed k times to give the final corrected key.
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the steps, see Figure 15: Alice and Bob break their key into length l blocks, depending on
the approximated QBER, QBERapprox. They compare the block parities {p1, p2, p3, ..., pn}
on the public channel. When parity does not match, the block includes an odd number of
errors (p2 error in the figure). Blocks with same parity are considered as good and stay
unchanged. Blocks with different parity are split in two, and the parity of each part is then
compared between Alice and Bob. The ”good” half-block is kept, the other one is split into
two, up to when the error is found. This communication reveals some information to Eve
that is exactly 1 parity bit each time. The key is then scrambled with a matrix M1 to find
the errors that have not been detected at first pass. This process is repeated many times
as a function of the error rate QBERapprox and the number of corrected errors each time.
The remaining error in the final key is exponentially small. The resulting key is then the
same between Alice and Bob with a very high probability.
Contrary to original error correction described by Bennett et al. [6], this process does
not discard any bit from the bit string. There exists more efficient protocols based on
syndromes transmission between Alice and Bob [15].
Error correction gives the exact value of the initial error rate without revealing the key.
While the errors that are assumed to be introduced by Eve, the information gathered by
Eve is not eliminated. Alice and Bob can not use the key as is.
2.1.2 Privacy Amplification and Information
After the error correction, Alice and Bob have the same bit string, but that is not fully
secret. They know the exact key initial error rate, QBERexact. One can compute the amount
of bits τ that the key must be reduced, so Eve’s information drops below a threshold ξ [52].
This step is referred as privacy amplification. Alice chooses randomly a binary matrix
Mτ of size (n− τ) × n and transmits it to Bob on the public channel. The final key Kfinal
is then:
Kfinal = Mτ ·Kcorrected. (30)
The value τ may be evaluated based on the amount of information Eve has been able
to retrieve. Consider that Alice’s, Bob’s and Eve’s binary strings are random variables
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Eve’s Information (n− τ bits)
Alice and Bob’s final key Kcorrected (n bits)
Kfinal (τ bits)Kfinal = Mτ ·Kcorrected
Figure 16: Privacy Amplification.
α, β and ε with joint probability density function P (α, β, ε). Alice and Bob have access to
marginal density function P (α, β) from which they can deduct Eve’s maximal information.
Alice and Bob can then establish a secret key when [19]:
I(α, β) ≥ I(α, ε) or I(α, β) ≥ I(β, ε), (31)
where I(α, β) is the Shannon mutual information between Alice and Bob, I(α, β) = H(α)−
H(α/β) where H is Shannon entropy. In other words, it is possible to have a secret key

























Figure 17: Intuitive representation Alice, Bob, and Eve’s information.
It is possible to intuitively understand Equation (31) thanks to Figure 17. During error
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correction step, Eve gains as much information as Bob does. Thus, the mutual informa-
tion difference stays the same. After error correction, the Alice-Bob mutual information
is equal to 1, see Figure 17(b). After privacy amplification, Eve’s information is zero, see
Figure 17(c). Finally, Bob reduces the key by discarding bits during the privacy amplifica-
tion step. Alice and Bob share all secret information., see Figure 17(d).
2.2 Eavesdropping and Attacks on QKD.
It is now necessary to evaluate the maximum amount of information gathered by Eve for a
given error amount observed on the channel. Attacks performed on the quantum channel
may be split into different categories. When Eve performs an incoherent attack, she attacks
each transmitted photon individually with a probe, i.e., a state prepared by Eve that will
interact with the ”attacked” state. She then stores it in a quantum memory to perform
later further measurement, see Section 2.2.1. The second possible set of attacks are the
incoherent attacks. Eve performs a unitary quantum operation on one of her probe and all
the transmitted photons at the same time. Then Eve may gather a coherent information
on the entire transmission, see Section 2.2.2.
2.2.1 Incoherent Attacks.
For incoherent attack, Eve attacks one transmitted photon after an other in a sequential
manner, see Figure 18. One can study in a classical way this type of attack. Alice, Bob, and
Eve have classical information modeled as random variables α, β and ε. Quantum physics














Figure 18: Incoherent Attack
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2.2.1.1 Incoherent Attacks Maximum Efficiency
Eve generates a quantum state (probe) that will be use to interact with each photon on the
quantum channel using a unitary transformation. The cloning machine attack is the best
efficiency symmetric attack that Eve can perform. It gives maximum information to Eve,




QBER +O(QBER2) ≈ 2.9 · QBER. (32)
Bob’s Shannon information is decreasing:
I(α, β) = H(α) −H(β/α)








Alice-Bob Information I(α, β)








Figure 19: Eve-Bob information as a function of the QBER.
Curves from both Equations (32) and (33) are drawn in Figure 19. They cross QBER0
where:







The BB84 protocol is secure against any individual attack if and only if QBER <
QBER0. One can then proceed to classical privacy amplification to extract a secret key.
Otherwise the transmission should be stop.
This threshold is derived for one-direction privacy amplification protocols. There ex-
ists some advantage distillation protocols using bidirectional communication, that have a
maximum acceptable QBER of 30% [26].
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2.2.1.2 Incoherent Attack Example: Intercept and Resend
For example of attack on the system, Eve measures the states sent by Alice on a random
selected basis and sends prepared states to Bob that are exactly what she measured. This
attack is called Intercept-and-Resend. Table 3 describes all possible cases corresponding to
the selection of bases, bits, by Alice and Eve.
Table 3: Eve’s Receive & Resend Attack. Eve is in the middle of the channel. ? shows a
random measured result, - shows a discarded measured state. Half of the shared bits are
random. The final error rate is 25%.
Bit to be send 0 1 0 1
Base U U V V
Alice |u0〉 |u1〉 |v0〉 |v1〉
Eve’s Meas. U V U V U V U V
Outcome 0 ? 1 ? ? 0 ? 1
Eve sends |u0〉 ? |u1〉 ? ? |v0〉 ? |v1〉
Bob’s Meas. U V U V U V U V U V U V U V U V
Shared bit 0 - ? - 1 - ? - - ? - 0 - ? - 1
Half of Bob’s string is shared by Alice. The second half though has been detected at
random, half of it is then correct, half is false. In a perfect quantum channel, Eve does
introduce 25% error on the final key. With this method, Eve gathers the maximum infor-
mation on the transmission [39], but it creates a very high error rate above the acceptable
15% rate to extract a secret key between Alice and Bob.
2.2.1.3 Incoherent Attack Example: Breidbart Basis Measurement
The previous attack is also the most intuitive, as Eve performs the same measurements as
Bob and sends back to Bob prepared states. Eve uses the correct basis only half of the
time. She knows the exact bit when the correct basis is used.
For a more complex attack, she measures the bits in a intermediate basis shifted by θ
compared to |u〉 and |v〉, see Figure 20. When angle shift is θ = π/8, the basis is called
Breidbart basis [6].









Figure 20: Measurement in the Breitbart basis.
by Eve Y = {|b0〉, |b1〉} may be computed as follows:
IEve(X;Y ) = H(Y ) −H(Y/X). (35)

















To evaluate the conditional entropy H(Y/X), it is necessary to compute the detection
probability of a sent symbol. For bit 0, Alice chooses randomly to send |u0〉 or |v0〉, then:

























































































Figure 21: Eve’s binary channel and mutual information.
The mutual information IEve is sketched in Figure 21(b).
The maximum information gain is for θ = π/8, which corresponds to the Breidbart
basis. Mutual information is then IEve ≈ 0.399123. For the Intercept and Resend attack,
Eve detects every other time the correct bit value so her average information gain is 0.5 bit.
The Intercept and Resend Attack is more efficient then the Breidbart basis one.
For the Breidbart basis attack, Eve is able find the correct bit value with a 85% prob-
ability vs. 75% for the intercept and resend attack. This comes from the intercept and
resend attack that gives a deterministic value of the transmitted bit. For the Breidbart
base attack, we are always 85% sure that we have the correct bit value, that is thus a
probabilistic measure of the transmitted bit.
2.2.2 Coherent, Joint, and Collective Attacks.
Coherent attacks, also called joint attacks, are the most general where the photons can be
measured at the same time and the measurements are processed at one, see Figure 22. A
more restrictive set is called collective attacks, uses a probe for each sent photon, and then
all probes are processed at the same time with a quantum computer, see Figure 23.
2.2.2.1 Coherent or Joint Attacks
For coherent attacks, Eve uses a single high dimensional probe on all the photons at the same
time. She keeps it in a quantum memory until after the public discussion, see Figure 22.
She then performs a measurement to gather maximum information. The most general
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Figure 22: Coherent Attack. Eve uses a high dimension probe that interacts with all
photons sent by Alice. She keeps it in a quantum memory until all bases are revealed.
When Alice sends n qubits, Eve gathers the information I(α; ε) and Bob gains the
information I(α;β). We can write:
I(α; ε) + I(α;β) ≤ 1. (42)
This may be intuitively understood because Eve and Bob may not receive together more
information than Alice sent [25]. With Equation (31), the condition to extract a secret key
is I(α;β) ≥ 1/2, i.e., with using the Alice-Bob information as a function of the QBER:




which implies: QBER ≤11% [47, 62].
The 11% threshold is compatible with the 15% given for incoherent attacks, see Section 2.2.1.
The 15% threshold is necessary because there exists an explicit strategy that reaches this
limit. Though, if one suppose that Eve does not have the possibility to build a probe that
she may entangle no more than n0 photons, n0 < n, then there is a very negligible proba-
bility that errors may come from Eve tapping in the channel. Thus, the 15% threshold is
still valid [17, 4].
2.2.2.2 Collective Attacks
Collective attacks ar close to incoherent attacks because one probe per sent photon is used.
Eve may then use a POVM on all probes at the same time, considered then as a single large
















Figure 23: Collective Attack. Eve uses a high dimension quantum computer to process all
probes at the same time.
Only protocols using linear error correcting codes are considered in security proofs [9].
2.2.3 Practical and Theoretical Security
The security of a whole system must be studied under different aspects. Let consider first
the theoretical security. Quantum cryptography comes in where classical cryptography fails,
that is secret growing between remote parties. It is then possible to prove quantum cryp-
tography absolute security, even in the presence of noise and technological imperfections.
This security comes with a price. However, it is also not realistic to consider that a spy
has perfect technology to tap in the channel. We will also consider the financial cost as a
function of the desired security level.
2.2.3.1 Authentication
The quantum key distribution process is very sensitive to the man in the middle attack.
Eve places herself in the middle of the transmission link. She cuts the channel, then she acts
as Bob toward Alice and as Alice toward Bob, see Figure 24. Eve is now as a transparent
relay and knows all information going between Alice and Bob. It is then necessary that
Alice and Bob use authentication, i.e., they must be able to guarantee that the messages
have not been modified through the channel, by Eve for example. This step assures to be
immune versus the man in the middle attack.
Alice and Bob need only to authenticate the final key to guarantee that the whole





Figure 24: Man in the middle Attack. Eve places herself in the middle of the link and
spoofs both Alice and Bob.
Many classical cryptography techniques perform authentication when Alice and Bob share
some initial secret Kauth to sign the classical transmission.
The initial secret key Kauth is exponentially smaller than the new key Ksecr generated
with the QKD system, but long enough to enable authentication. Alice and Bob may use
an algorithm described in [71] with their initial secret key to generate a signature T , that
enables to check the authenticity of the message. Alice and Bob may keep part of the
new key to perform the authentication of the next QKD session. If Eve does not have
knowledge of the initial shared secret between Alice and Bob, she cannot interfere on the
authentication signature T . She would be detected by Alice and Bob.
It may look like a paradox that one need an initial secret to establish another secret.
Though, the necessary amount of secret for authentication is much less than the final
generated secret. As a result, quantum key distribution is much more about secret growing
than strictly key exchange.
2.2.3.2 Trojan Horse Attack
Up to now, Eve is trying to gain information by observing and working on the transmitted
qubits on the quantum channel. She may operate in a completely different way by using the
quantum channel itself to break into Alice and Bob’s apparatus. For example, she sends an
optical signal directly toward Alice or Bob to observe the inducted reflections. This strategy
is called Trojan horse attack. The reflected signal analysis may then give information on
the system current state, modulators state, polarizer state, or anything that encodes the
information.
It is possible to argue that filters and circulators may avoid reflections, and thus, dras-
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Figure 25: Trojan Horse Attack.
and Bob are using only a one way quantum communication, so Alice may block incoming
signals, and Bob blocks outgoing signals.
Once one assumes that Eve has no limitation other than theoretical ones, while Alice
and Bob may be faced with technical limitations, Eve may be able to gain access to some
information. Such paradigm brings quantum cryptography into the discussion regarding
scientific assessment of secrecy vs. technically achievable secrecy
2.2.3.3 Theoretical Security and Practical Cost
Quantum physics principle may be challenged by a new theory. Though, it is reasonable to
consider that today’s description will still stand for a photon transmitted over an optical
fiber. This is the same for the Newtonian physics that describes planets trajectories or
apple falls. After all, transmission security may not rely only on theoretical quantum
physics properties. Today’s implementation has it own limitations.
Despite the elegance and generality of security proofs, the idealness of quantum cryptog-
raphy system whose security relies entirely on quantum principles is unrealistic. Abstract
concepts implementation will be always jeopardized. This may still be the weak point of all
systems. Moreover, one should always keep in mind that infinite secrecy requires infinite
cost and has an almost zero interest.
There are two important advantages for quantum cryptography. First of all, it is much
easier to broadcast technological than mathematical progress. The threat that quantum
cryptography may be broken overnight is negligible, but this is not the case for public key
45
cryptosystems. Then, quantum cryptography security depends on the adversary techno-
logical level at the time of the key exchange. Though, for classical systems, the message
may be recorded and broken using future advances in cryptanalysis. This last point is very
useful for secrets that need to last for years.
A significant advantage for quantum cryptography is its sensitivity to today ’s technology.
It is impossible for an eavesdropper to perform an attack after the transmission a contrario
classical transmission, where it is easy to read and record the encrypted information to
decipher it later.
A possible answer to today’s very high security need is to use quantum key distribution
with classical symmetric algorithms such as AES at the same time, for which a frequent
encryption key enables a quasi-perfect security level, see Figure 26.
K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6
AES(K1) AES(K2) AES(K3) AES(K4) AES(K5)
Data Channel
QKD Channel
Figure 26: Encryption key use.
2.3 Imperfect photon sources and PNS Attack
Quantum key distribution protocols based on BB84 need a perfect single photon source to
have unconditional security. Ideal single photon source are today not available, one must
then study the security of imperfect sources. Eve may perform an attack by gathering a
photon when the pulse does contain more than one photon. This attack is called the photon
number splitting attack (PNS attack), Eve gains information without disturbing the signal.
This attack will be specifically studied with a fainted laser that outputs a significant amount
of multiphoton pulses, see Section 2.3.1.
A solution proposed by Huttner is to use a strong reference in the system [40]. The
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amount of information gathered by Eve is a function of the initial average power, one can
then compute the maximum possible amount of secret information to be extracted, see
Section 2.3.2.
2.3.1 Single Photon Source and PNS Attack
We will study how multiple photons in a single pulse, combined with a lossy channel and
an imperfect detector may impact security. However, Eve is only limited by physics and
has access to perfect technology, perfect translucent fiber or perfect single photon source
for example. Quantum non-destructive (QND) measurement photon number measurement
complies to physics laws and gives the possibility for Eve to count the number of photons
in a pulse without disturbing them. She may then use this measurement to attack pulses
containing more than one photon.
2.3.1.1 Fainted Lasers and Multiphoton Pulses
Today’s QKD prototypes use fainted lasers. They produce a coherent state |Ψ〉, a pure
k-photons states mix. By using a pulsed laser with initial average energy µ, the probability





For µ=2, the ratio of pulses with k photons is then p0 = 0.135, p1 = 0.271, p2 = 0.271, ...,
see Figure 27(a).
The state of ω0 frequency and Φ phase laser pulse may be described as the superposition








where |k〉 is a ground state with k photons. The ratio of multiphoton pulses pµ(k ≥ 2) over













1 − pµ(k = 0) − pµ(k = 1)
1 − pµ(k = 0)
=
1 − e−µ − µe−µ
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(b) Multiphoton pulses percentage as a function of
initial average number of photon per pulse µ.
Figure 27: Multiphoton Pulses.
A laser source is far from being a perfect single photon source. When a low energy level
is chosen, there are few multiphoton pulses, but the number of single photon pulses is also
very low. It is then a very low efficiency source. If we use a more important energy level,
most of the pulses include more one photon, but many pulses include also more than one
photon. Thus, this is not a perfect single photon source.
Pulses that contain more than one photon contain several photons bearing the same
encoded information. Many copies of the same photon are then directly accessible to Eve.
The PNS attack in an efficient attack that uses these characteristics.
2.3.1.2 The PNS Attack
Eve performs a non destructive measurement to determine the number of photons in each
pulse and remains unnoticed. Eve thus knows the number of photons in the pulse without
disturbing it. When the pulse contains more than one photon, she steals one. She keeps it
in a quantum memory; this photon is in the same quantum state as the others in the pulse.
Eve forwards the remaining photons to Bob thanks to a perfect translucent lossless fiber,
see Figure 28.
After Alice and Bob publicly reveal their prepared and measured bases, Eve may perform
her measurement in the correct basis. She gains a deterministic value of the encoded bit.
When the pulse contains only one single photon, either she blocks it, or she forwards it
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to Bob. Such choice is made as a function of the amount of pulse that Bob is awaiting.
For a fiber distance d, the amount of pulse at Bob’s input equals the number of pulses at
Alice’s output attenuated by the fiber, with losses 10−
αd
10 , with α = 0, 25dB/km for standard
monomode fiber. Beyond the critical distance d0, Eve forwards to Bob only the multiphoton































Figure 28: PNS Attack Principle
Though, if Alice and Bob decide to run a transmission for a distance shorter than d0,






, to not be detected. Eve blocks only a part q of the pulses containing a
single photon, to adjust the number of pulses received by Bob. This quantity q depends on
the distance d between Alice and Bob and must satisfy:
pµ(k ≥ 2) + (1 − q) × pµ(k = 1) = pµ′(k ≥ 1), (47)
With µ′ = µ · 10−αd10 . Then, the amount of blocked pulses q is expressed as a function of
distance d and initial energy µ:
q(d, µ) = 1 − pµ′(k ≥ 1) − pµ(k ≥ 2)
pµ(k = 1)
. (48)
The amount of information the Eve knows, see Figure 29, IEve is a function of q, thus a
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Figure 29: Eve’s information IEve as a function of distance d between Alice and Bob.
α = 0.25dB/km.
Eve’s information is a function of both variables d and µ. Eve’s information must be
lower than 1, to enable Alice and Bob to extract a secret from the shared information they
have. On Figure 29, the operating points are located in the valley. The plateau corresponds
to high energy µ and high distances d, where Eve has all the information that Bob has.
The acceptable area is located for low µ and small distances. To authorize secret extraction
over long distances d, it is necessary to use an exponentially small energy µ.
The space (µ, d) is split into two regions, where it is possible to extract a secret or not,
from the top line that corresponds to critical distance d0, that is distance over which Eve
knows all the information, i.e., q = 1, as a function of initial average energy µ, see Figure 30.




ln[ln(1 − µ)]. (50)
For standard monomode fiber with average energy 0.1 photon per pulse, critical distance
is 52km [1], which is very low compare to standard telecom distances. For over 40km
transmission, and not to compromise security, Eve has half the Alice-Bob information; they
must extract secret information from the key. Moreover, the 0.1 photon per pulse energy
level limits the final bit rate.
The use of fainted laser, or more generally an imperfect single photon source, opens a
security gap. Using the PNS attack, Eve may know an important part of the information.













Figure 30: Possible secret communication area with a fainted laser source. Secret extraction
is possible in the blue area. The red zone corresponds the values where Eve knows all the
information (when α = 0.25dB/km).
with today’s technology1. Moreover, Raleigh and Raman diffusions impose a limit to per-
formance of glass fibers. Eve must find a new technology that authorizes such translucent
fiber to perform the PNS attack.
2.3.2 Reference and Reference Protocol
Multiphoton pulse combined with lossy fibers limit security. Eve may even retrieve all
Alice-Bob information when they are separated from a distance larger than d0. The PNS
attack relies on the fact that Bob may not determine the origin of the signal ”loss”. A
pulse containing no photon may have multiple origins: a pulse that indeed did not contain
any photon at Alice’s output, or a pulse that contained one or more photons, but has been
stopped by the fiber attenuation. This uncertainty benefits Eve that can simply block the
pulses, without being detected by Bob, thus, without being caught.
A proposal to avoid such security breach is to prevent Eve to be undetected when
she blocks a pulse. Huttner proposed to include in the signal a reference that will be
always detected [40]. It forces Bob to detect the reference at the same time as the pulse,
guaranteeing that the pulse has been sent from Alice to Bob, even if Bob may not detect
some information signal. A last argument given Lütkenhaus [46] is the robustness of such an
1Well, Q may have one in his tool kit
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implementation because the absence of reference would indicate that Eve is in the system.
The implementation of a strong reference in the system guarantees that the communication
is secure against the PNS attack for any distance.
A strong reference must fulfill two conditions:
1. The reference must always be detected in the signal.
2. The reference must be intertwined with the signal. It should not be possible to have
a reference signal without information signal.
2.3.2.1 Eve’s Information with a Reference and Optimum Energy
When Eve performs a PNS attack, she gathers information extracted from multiphoton
pulses without disturbing the signal. Those are the only one pulses from which she can
gain information without disturbing the signal. When Bob is at a distance d from Alice, he
receives only (1 − e−µ′) pulses, where µ′ = µ · 10−αd10 .
As all pulses are attenuated in the same way, the proportion of detected pulses that
contain k photons is the same as initial proportion at distance d = 0. Multiphoton pulses
known by Eve represent the same ratio as initial pµ(k ≥ 2), at any distance d from Alice to





1 − e−µ − µe−µ
1 − e−µ (51)
Eve’s information as a function of the initial average energy µ may be sketch in Figure 31.
Eve’s information is a function of only one variable µ. It depends only on distance d.
To be able to extract secret information from the transmission, it is still necessary to be in
an area where Eve’s information is lower than 1. This is always the case now the amount of
information that Eve may know is always known and lower to Bob’s information. Then, any
µ is suitable for secret transmission. For high initial average energy, µ ≥ 2, Eve’s information
is high, and privacy amplification must be performed to reduce Eve’s information.
Privacy amplification to reduce the information known by the PNS attack forces to
reduce from an initial length n0 to a new length n = n0 − τ0:
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Figure 31: Eve’s Information IrefEve with a strong reference is only a function of the Alice-Bob
distance d, with α = 0.25dB/km
Initial key length n0 is proportional to the number of pulses received by Bob that contain
at least one photon:
n0 = N0 · pµ(k ≥ 1)10−
αd
10 = N0(1 − e−µ)10−
αd
10 , (53)
where N0 is the initial pulse frequency of pulses generated by Alice.
Thanks to Equations (52) and (53), the final key length n is proportional to µe−µ that
is exactly the probability pµ(1) to have exactly one photon in a pulse.
The information gathered by Eve may not be amplified because Bob detects the reference
for all pulses. For long distances, the reference may also be attenuated, that may the benefit
Eve, who may then lower also the reference signal that she sends back to Bob, and thus,
attenuate the generated error.
2.3.2.2 Maximum Bit Rate with a Laser Source
To have a maximum length final key, one must optimize the initial average energy value µ.
The probability pµ(1) = µe
−µ shows a maximum for µ = 1, see Figure 32.
The presence of a strong reference makes the system resistant to the PNS attack. Secret
information that Bob may gather comes from single photon pulses sent by Alice, that is






















Figure 32: Probability to have exactly one photon in a pulse. One can observe a maximum
for µ = 1.
2.3.2.3 PNS Attack and Error Rate
When Eve performs the PNS attack, she does not create any error. In presence of errors
in the practical system, we must assume that all these errors come from Eve tapping in
the signal to gain information on the transmission. Her best strategy is to perform a PNS
attack first on the multiphoton pulses, and then to perform an optimum incoherent attack
or a coherent attack is she has access to the required technology. Thus, she will create
errors, but only on part of the photons observed by Bob. The final observed error rate must
be considered as coming only from the pµ(1) part of the key.
For example, if Alice uses initial average energy µ = 1, then, p1(1) = 0.368 and p1(k ≥
2) = 0.264 and IEve = 0.418, thus lower as the overall error generated by Eve. Privacy
amplification described in Section 2.1.2 must be performed with a 6% QBER to compute
an adequate τ reduction coefficient.
2.4 Conclusion
Quantum key distribution uses first a quantum channel. Alice prepares quantum particles
and sends them to Bob to the other end of the quantum channel. Quantum physics measure-
ments of uncertainty must be precise with a classical communication on the authenticated
channel. Alice and Bob proceed then to the following steps, reconciliation, comparison,
error correction, and privacy amplification to finally extract a secret key.
Quantum communication security, in case of no errors, is straight forward. Though,
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errors may due to technological imperfection in used physical systems. To reach a perfect
secrecy level, we consider that all errors are due to an eavesdropper tapping in the signal
and invariably creating errors.
Eve may perform two different types of attack on the system. Incoherent attacks where
particles are attack one after the other and coherent attack where all the particles are
attacked as a whole quantum system. The maximum acceptable error rate is then 15% and
11% respectively for each attack type, from which Eve does know all information on the
channel.
Shannon’s information theory proves that with one time pad algorithm [68], the com-
munication is perfectly secure. On a practical point of view, very high security level may
be reach by using a quantum channel to generate continuously encryption keys that is then
renewed as a seed for a more complex cryptographic application. It becomes very difficult
to break the system because the key is used for a very short period of time.
Quantum cryptographic systems security may be perfect even when using non perfect
single photon sources. Eve can then perform a PNS attack to gather information from the
multiphoton pulses. This attack may be blocked with a strong reference detection in the
system. It is possible to use a fainted laser and still perform a secret communication, with
an optimum average energy per pulse to be one photon per pulse.
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CHAPTER III
CRYPTOGRAPHY AND FREQUENCY CODING: THE
SSB SYSTEM
The very seducing idea of using quantum cryptography for transmission in a full security
manner was born thanks to Wiesner in the early 80’s. In 1984, Bennett and Brassard pro-
posed a protocol [7] for quantum key distribution. This concept stayed then very marginal.
The scientific community did not give much heed to this theory. In 1992 with the first pro-
totype developed by Bennett et al. [6], quantum cryptography started to draw significant
attention.
The first experimentation used photon polarization to encode information in free space.
More experiments have been performed on optical fibers, where bits are encoded with photon
phase. Longer and longer distances are reached and are now over 100km [27]. This section
presents different coding methods, and introduces the SSB system developed by Merolla et
al. at the GTL-CNRS Telecom Laboratory, which serves as a starting point for work of this
thesis.
Quantum key distribution protocol implementation requires, for maximum efficiency,
a single photon source and perfect quantum detectors. Current technology limits such
devices. Thus, practical approximation is a fainted pulsed laser source, which is very easy to
implement, but has the inconvenience to generate multiphoton pulses as seen in Section 2.3.
A reference protocol may be used to guarantee confidentiality even with multiphoton pulses.
We will show in this chapter the implementation of such a reference.
3.1 Quantum Cryptography Experiments
Quantum cryptography protocols use a specific quantum state variable to encode infor-
mation. Different variables of photon state |Ψ〉 may be used, considering the transmission
medium and external physical constraints. Two variables are used in quantum cryptography
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to encode information: polarization and phase.
This section describes, first, systems using polarization, mainly for free space transmis-
sion, then systems developed on optical fibers use phase.
3.1.1 Polarization and Information Encoding
Polarization to encode information may be used to implement the BB84 protocol [7]. Let
consider four polarization states, horizontal →, vertical ↑, diagonal right ր, and diagonal








Figure 33: Polarization States on the Poincaré Sphere.
With a polarization crystal, it is possible to distinguish two polarizations that are op-
posed on the Poincaré sphere, for example → from ↑, or ր from տ. These states are
grouped into two bases horizontal-vertical (+) and diagonal (×). In these bases, photon
polarization may be exactly determined. When the cube is aligned with basis +, it is pos-
sible to separate exactly polarizations ↑ and → on the two cube outputs. In the same way,
it is possible to separate exactly polarizations ր and տ in basis ×. When a photon is not
polarized in the corresponding basis, it is impossible to determine its initial polarization
with a cube aligned with the other basis. The outcome of the cube is then randomly either
of the two polarizations.
For the BB84 protocol, we consider that polarization → and ↑ are states |u0〉 and |u1〉
from basis U , and ր and տ are states from basis V . We then have the polarization
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equivalence table for BB84 states, see Table 4.
Table 4: Polarization Equivalence Table.
Basis U : + V : ×
States
|u0〉: ↑ |u0〉: ր
|u1〉: → |u1〉: տ
The following quantum cryptography system uses polarization following this encoding
table.
3.1.2 Polarization Encoding Experiments
3.1.2.1 In Free Space: From 32cm to 23km
In 1992, with the first experimental quantum key distribution, Bennett and Brassard com-
municated over 32cm of free space with polarization information [6], see Figure 34.
Figure 34: First Quantum Key Distribution Prototype over 32cm of Free Space.
Polarization is widely used for free space transmission, because air enables low dispersion
and non-birefringence. This is also a simple and reliable method in terms of stability. It is
then possible to use a 800nm wavelength, where losses are low, and for which detectors have
a 50% efficiency. Alice uses a fainted laser to generate photons. Polarization encoding is
performed with Pockels cells to force polarizations ↑,→,ր,տ that correspond to the four
BB84 states. The measurement uses a polarization cube and two photon detectors.
Buttler implemented a 1km transmission at Los Alamos laboratory [14, 13]. Then, a
10km distance in daylight was reached in 2002 [38]. John Rarity and Tapster performed a
free space transmission on a 23.4km link in 2002 [55, 45].
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Free space transmission systems have the advantage to be quickly and easily deployed.
It is also possible to transmit information to satellites in low orbits and in a secure fashion.
Ground transmissions are sensitive to air turbulence that leads to optical beam instability,
thus increasing the transmission error rate [3].
3.1.2.2 Development of Optical Fiber Transmissions
Experiments have then been performed on optical fibers. The Geneva Groupe de Physique
Appliquée (GAP) built a transmission system over 1km [11]. This apparatus was an upgrade
















Figure 35: Polarization encoding principle. The pulse arrives at t = t1 if it went through
the short arm, and at t = t2 if it went through the long arm. We can then determine the
initial polarization state.
The system principle is depicted in Figure 35. Alice uses a fainted laser source and a
polarizer to encode the photon polarization state following her random basis and bit choice.
Bob uses the two polarization separator outputs, one includes a long arm L. One can
delay the pulse on one arm, and determine as a function of arrival time, the initial input
polarization.
The first experiment on a deployed fiber was performed in 1995 over a 23km distance [51]
between cities of Geneva and Nyon. The chosen wavelength was 1300nm in order to min-
imize transmission losses, and to use efficient detectors. This experiment used an optical
fiber that is, contrary to free space, birefringent where it is difficult to control polarization
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variations. An additional polarization control must be included to make this experiment
stable in time.
3.1.3 Phase and Information Encoding
The quantum information can be encoded on the phase of a photon with respect to pulses.
Information encoding with phase may be interpreted as the use of a very large interferometer
where one can slightly modify the optical path length, and thus, modify the pulse phase on







Figure 36: Phase Encoding with BB84 protocol.
When both phases Φ1 and Φ2 are identical, i.e., Φ1 = Φ2, the resulting interferences
from this long interferometer are constructive and light is detected on detector S0. When
the phase difference is π, |Φ2−Φ1| = π, light is observed on the second mode interferometer
output S1. When the phase difference is ±π/2, |Φ2 −Φ1| = ±π/2, energy is evenly split on
both modes, that is half on S0 and half on S1.
For the BB84 protocol, we consider the following four phase values for Φ1: Φ1 = 0: |u0〉,
Φ1 = π: |u1〉, Φ1 = +π/2: |v0〉, Φ1 = −π/2: |v1〉. Bob’s measurement on one of either bases
is determined by phase Φ2: either Φ2 = 0 for basis U , or Φ2 = +π/2 for basis V . When
the initial state is chosen in a different basis, the phase difference is ±π/2 and the energy
is split over the two interferometer outputs. When an incident photon must be detected
with a phase difference |∆Φ| = ±π/2, detection occurs randomly on either output. There
is finally an equivalence table to implement BB84 protocol with phase, see Table 5.
Table 5: Phase Equivalence Table.
Basis U : Φ2 = 0 V : Φ2 = π/2
States
|u0〉: Φ1 = 0 |v0〉: Φ1 = +π/2
|u1〉: Φ1 = π |v1〉: Φ1 = −π/2
The phase encoding hurdle is to keep the length of two interferometer arms constant.
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The light paths must be identical, i.e., the relative variations are very small compared
with the optical wavelength. All practical systems develop methods to compensate possible
physical length variations.
3.1.4 Phase Encoding Experiments
3.1.4.1 Time Separated Signals
In 1993, Townsend, Rarity, and Tapser proposed a quantum cryptography system using
photon phase [66, 65], that combines the links of the very long interferometer into two





















Figure 37: Phase Encoding Principle. Two pulses exit Alice apparatus, and interfere on
Bob’s side.
The schematic in Figure 37 uses a single fiber between Alice and Bob. Alice generated
a pulse from a laser source S. It is split by a first beam splitter toward two arms, where
the first one, the long arm L1 includes an extra fiber length to delay the pulse. The short
arm includes an optical phase shifter Φ1. The two recombined pulses are time separated.
These pulses are split again at Bob’s input, whose interferometer includes also a long and a
short arm, to recombine pulse and induce interference. The resulting interference outcomes
on output 0 or 1 is a function of the phase difference ∆Φ = Φ2 − Φ1.
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The quality of the interferences relies on the fact that both long arms from Alice’s and
Bob’s interferometers have exactly identical optical paths, which is hard to maintain over
a long period of time.
In 2002, Inoue, Waks, and Yamamoto developed [42, 41] a system with only one interfer-
ometer described in Figure 38. Alice generates light pulses at a given rate f0. These pulses
are modulated with a phase modulator before being injected through the optical fiber. Bob
uses an unbalanced interferometer, which optical path difference L corresponding exactly
to delay τ0 = 1/f0. Then, each photon interferes with the next pulse, making impossible
for an eavesdropper to extract only one pulse. This system presents the advantage to use a









Figure 38: Phase Difference Shift System. Pulses are sent at f0 frequency where time τ0
corresponds to the propagation over the distance L. Then, each pulse interferes with the
following and previous pulses.
3.1.4.2 The Plug&Play System
The quantum key distribution system called Plug&Play was developed initially by Stucki
et al. in 1993 [63]. It uses phase. It is able to compensate for component characteristics
fluctuation over time. Optical pulses make a round trip between Alice and Bob. The
problem of maintaining the interferometer arm length is then alleviated. Information is
encoded in the phase between two optical time separated pulses, see Figure 39.
While Alice is the source of the transmission, the 1550nm wavelength laser is located on
Bob’s side. He sends two pulses through the fiber to Alice. She applies a Φ1 phase shift on
the second pulse with a phase modulator PMA and reflects the pulse to Bob with a Faraday
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Figure 39: Plug&Play QKD System Principle. [63].
mirror FM. The pulse is received by Bob, who applies a Φ2 phase shift on one arm. Then,
the pulses interfere in the beam splitter. This interference is detected on two sensors D1
and D2. The system auto-compensates the optical path variations as each pulse travels
on the same path back and forth. This system has been tested on a fiber going under the
Geneva lake, over 67km between Lausanne, Geneva, and Nyon cities. This principle has
been used by a startup company IdQuantique. It packaged into a standard telecom rack as
a final commercial product.
3.1.4.3 Frequency Separated Signals
Another way to encode phase is to use two different frequencies. Duraffourg showed that
the relative phase difference between two frequency separated pulses that may interfere
to recover initial phase of transmitted signal [49]. The principle was then developed to
complete a quantum key transmission using the BB84 protocol [22, 48, 35]. This setup is
the one we will study in detail in this thesis.
All presented methods are very sensitive to mechanical variations and require specific
setups to maintain stability over time. In optical transmission systems developed on large
scale, many components designed for phase modulation are produced. These may be used
for a quantum key distribution setup where coding is performed with frequency separated
signals.
One may also notice that quantum cryptography is entering the industrialization era.
Some companies, still at the startup stage, are attempting to provide security systems
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including quantum cryptography tools. Current products are available from IdQuantique,
Switzerland, MagiQ Technologies, US, QinetiQ, UK, for which the implementation of QKD
principles are kept unpublished. Other companies such as Toshiba, BBN, and HP are
deploying QKD links.
3.2 Single Side Band (SSB) Encoding
3.2.1 Frequency Encoding
3.2.1.1 Frequency Domain and Modulation
The quantum variable chosen to encode states is the relative phase between two waves with
very close frequencies. We consider the phase difference between a pulse with a given optical
frequency and its side bands generated by modulation. The use of the frequency domain
enables a narrow temporal spread. The information is sent at multiple frequencies inside a
single pulse. Time and spectral domain are efficiently used. Coding in frequency domain is
easily accessible with standard telecom modulators whose performance is well known and
described thereafter.
3.2.1.2 Modulators and Frequency Manipulation
A telecom modulator relies on the electro-optic effect of material such as Lithium Niobate
substrate (LiNbO3) whose optical index varies with a applied voltage perpendicularly to
the optical path. By creating electrodes on a wave guide in such material, one can change
the optical path. The magnetic wave field describing the optical wave in the wave guide
varies. Modulators affecting frequencies are from three types: phase modulators, standard




(b) Standard MZI Modulator
V0 V1(t)−V0 −V1(t)
(c) Push-Pull MZI Modulator
Figure 40: Phase Modulator and Mach-Zhender Modulators Architectures.
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Phase Modulator In phase modulators, see Figure 40(a), when the modulation voltage
is applied to electrodes, V1(t) = m sin(Ωt+Φ), it modifies the optical index as a function of
time at frequency Ω. The resulting modulation function introduces a sinusoidal wave phase
shift which is:
TPhase = e
KV1(t) = ejKm sin(Ωt+Φ), (54)
where K is a coefficient that is electro-optic material dependent, and m is the modulation
depth, proportional to the amplitude V1(t).
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The modulator transforms a single frequency signal E(t) = E0e
jω0t into a signal with
multiple harmonic frequencies ω0 + nΩ. Considering that m ≪ 1, only first order in m























Figure 41 shows spectra amplitudes at phase modulator output for different value of m.
From Figure 41(b) and 41(c), the central peak at frequency ω0 no longer has a normalized
amplitude of one. Peaks at second harmonics frequencies ω0 ± 2Ω appear then. When
modulation depth m has become too important to be considered as ”low”, the first order
in m expansion from Equation (56) is not longer sufficient. It is necessary to consider the
second order in m:


















Standard MZI For standard MZIs, the structure includes two arms, one of them includ-
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(a) Low amplitude modula-
tion depth m = 0.1
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(b) Average amplitude mod-
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(c) High amplitude modula-
tion depth m = 2
Figure 41: Spectrum amplitude at the phase modulator output for a normalized input.
Figures are drawn with different modulation depth values m.
shift ejKV0 = ejΨ. A second sinusoidal voltage V1(t) creates an additional variation of the
optical path ejKV1(t). The resulting modulation transfer function is:
TMZI =
1 + ejΨejm sin(Ωt+Φ)
2
. (58)
For m≪ 1, the modulator output may be expressed at the first order in m:
TMZIE(t) = E0e
jω0t












The central peak amplitude is now dependent on Ψ.
Push-pull MZI Finally, the push-pull MZI modulator spreads the modulation voltage
on both arms: positive voltage on the first one, and inverse voltage on the second one, see
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Figure 40(c). The modulator output is then at first order in m:
TMZI push-pullE(t) = E0e
jω0t



























ω0 − Ω ω0 + Ω
(a) Ψ = 0
1
ω0
ω0 − Ω ω0 + Ω
(b) Ψ = π/4
1
ω0
ω0 − Ω ω0 + Ω
(c) Ψ = π/2
Figure 42: Push-pull MZI output spectrum amplitude for different bias voltage values Ψ.
Phase modulators or MZIs are effective components to control the time delay (or phase
delay) between signals at different frequencies. Their characteristics are very well known,
as they are used in standard telecommunication networks.
3.2.2 SSB Principle and Double Modulation
As described in the previous part, information encoding with relative phase between two
signals at different frequencies makes an efficient use of the time domain. The system
developed at GTL-CNRS Telecom uses the relative phase between the central peak and the
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modulated side bands. The modulation scheme permits the detection of a single side band


















Figure 43: SSB Modulation Scheme Principle.
3.2.2.1 System Architecture Description
On Alice’s side, the system includes an optical line made of a laser diode generating optical
pulses at frequency ω0 and a modulator MZI1. The fiber link between Alice and Bob is then
connected on Bob’s side to a modulator MZI2. The optical signal is filtered to extract three
frequencies ω0 − Ω, ω0, and ω0 + Ω. Three amplitude detectors D−, D0, and D+ measure
the signal amplitudes iω0−Ω, iω0 et iω0+Ω respectively.
An electrical line controls the modulators and includes an RF oscillator at frequency Ω.
An electric shifter adjusts the phase Φ1 of the signal applied to modulator MZI1. Bob has
also an oscillator at frequency Ω synchronized on Alice’s one and a second phase shifter to
set phase Φ2 of the signal applied to modulator MZI2.
3.2.2.2 System Operating Principle
A laser diode generates an optical field E1(t) = E0e
jω0t. This signal is modulated through
MZI1 and driven by a sinusoidal voltage V1(t) = m sin(Ωt + Φ1), with m ≪ 1, and a
continuous polarization voltage V 10 that creates a constant phase shift on one arm e
jΨ1 .












The signal is transmitted along the fiber. Upon arrival, Bob modulates the received




















































































































4 + ej(∆Φ+∆Ψ) + ej(−∆Φ−∆Ψ) + ejΨ1 + e−jΨ1 + ejΨ2 + e−jΨ2















































































































Both solutions are equivalent to exchange both Alice’s and Bob’s modulators. The central











































One can notice that when the relative phase difference ∆Φ is 0 or π, the energy outside
central peak is located on one side band and one only. When ∆Φ = ±π/2, the energy is
evenly split on both sidebands, see Figure 44.
3.2.2.3 SSB Scheme with Push-Pull MZI and Phase Modulator.
The above configuration may also be achieved with a single push-pull modulator with bias
Ψ and sinusoidal signal ∼ Ωt+ Φ1 on a phase modulator with modulation sinΩt+ Φ2. The
































Figure 44: Intensities measured on sidebands at frequencies ω0−Ω (dotted line) and ω0 +Ω
(plain line), as a function of relative phase difference ∆Φ.















































































As only one condition on the bias voltage of the push-pull modulator is required, the
implementation of such a system is easier.
3.2.3 System Behavior Summary
















where α is a constant.
Condition on the modulator bias voltages:




















Ψ = π/4, or Ψ = 3π/4,
or Ψ = 5π/4, or Ψ = 7π/4
3.2.4 Quantum Interpretation of the SSB Scheme
When the pulse energy is strongly lowered, the above behavior remains unchanged. Fainted
light pulses are modeled with coherent states (Glauber states) or quasi-classical states.
The classical description of the modulation scheme stays valid for quantum states. It
is possible to build an equivalence between variable elements and quantum variables, mea-
surements and projections, that matches the BB84 protocol description in Section 1.2.1.
In quantum regime, the photon detection probability is proportional to the incoming
signal energy. When ∆Φ = 0 or ∆Φ = π, only one detector D+ or D− may have an
incoming photon. In the same manner, when ∆Φ = ±π/2, the photon is randomly detected
on one or the other detector. Thus, it is possible to implement the BB84 protocol [7] as
described by Duraffourg [22].
The initial bias phase Φ1 Alice’s modulation electric signal corresponds to the initial
choice of the quantum state to be sent. Bob’s electric signal bias phase Φ2 corresponds
to the basis of the quantum measurement. The quantum projection corresponds to the
frequency filtering and detection to measure the state on a given basis.
The states from basis B1, |u0〉 and |u1〉, correspond to Alice’s initial phases 0 and π.
The states from basis B2, |v0〉 and |v1〉, correspond to phase state +π/2 and −π/2. We
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have then:
Φ1 = 0 7→ |u0〉 Φ1 = π/2 7→ |v0〉
Φ1 = π 7→ |u1〉 Φ1 = −π/2 7→ |v1〉
(78)
In the same manner, Bob’s measurement with a given basis may be matched to Bob’s
modulator phase Φ2. The measurement is then a rotation of the state sent by Alice along











































































It is then possible to implement the BB84 protocol as described in Section 1.2.1. First,
Alice prepares one pulse among four possible states and sends the pulse modulated with
phase Φ1 randomly chosen in EΦ = {0, π/2π,−π/2}. Second, Bob receives the pulse and
remodulates it with a phase Φ2 chosen in E
′
Φ = {0, π/2}. Finally, Bob uses two detectors
D+ et D−. The BB84 protocol may then be summarized in Table 6.
3.3 Single Side Pulse (SSP) Encoding
Phase encoding with time separated pulses is used in many quantum key distribution sys-
tems [66, 42, 63]. Inoue also introduced a three arm modulator for QKD [41]. The use
of time-energy vs. frequency-time entanglement for quantum information communication
makes the time filtering easier vs. frequency filtering.
To conserve the advantage of the strong reference in the SSB, that makes it resistant to
the PNS attack, I introduce a transposition of the SSB in the time domain called single side
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Table 6: BB84 Protocol with SSB System. Black disks  show a full detection probability,
and white disks  show a half probability for each detector.
Alice’s Bit Alice Φ1 Bob Φ2 Difference ∆Φ D
+ D− Shared Bit
1 0
0 0  1
+π/2 +π/2   -
0 π
0 π  0
+π/2 −π/2   -
1 +π/2
0 −π/2   -
+π/2 0  1
0 −π/2 0 +π/2   -
+π/2 π  0
pulse (SSP) detection scheme. As for the SSB scheme with frequencies, the SSP scheme
relies on multiple time separated pulses to the sides of a main strong energy pulse. A three
pulse sequence encodes the information in the phase difference between the main powerful
pulse and the other two weak pulses.
The secure capacity of the quantum channel can be viewed the same way as for a
classical channel. The transposition into of the SSB scheme in the time domain to give the
SSP scheme is motivated by the need of increased throughput for a given channel. With
both SSB and SSP, it is possible to multiplexed then and use coding such as Quadrature
Amplitude Modulation1, or QAM [54], to increase throughput and get closer to the capacity.
3.3.1 Time Domain Modulation
The SSB uses MZIs to encode information. It creates sidebands along the main peak. It is
not possible to create directly a side pulse that would be before the main pulse. So we can
take advantage of propagation time and delay the main pulse.
We propose to use a three arm interferometer to match the MZI behavior in the time
domain, see Figure 45. It allows to introduce two side pulses aside the main pulse. The
second and third lines include delay lines of length L and 2L. An additional bias phase Ψ
is applied to set the operating point. Finally, an extra phase Φ is applied in opposite sign
to encode information.
1Quadrature amplitude modulation is a big name for a relatively simply technique. It is simply a com-





















Figure 45: Single Side Pulse Interferometer Principle.
When a single frequency laser pulse δ(t)E0e
jω0t is sent to the interferometer, see Figure 46(a),
























where τL is the delay induced by L, t1 = t− τ ′1 − τL, and t∗1 = t− τ ′1 − 2τL.
When the recombined signals, two side pulses are created, see Figure 46(b). Their
relative phase difference to the main pulse is Φ and −Φ, respectively, and is the information
encoded in the signal.
This modulation Figure 46(b), and the Equation (82) are the exact same as in the
frequency domain with Figure 41(b) and Equation (59). The delay τL introduced by the
extra length of the modulator corresponds to the modulation frequency Ω in the frequency
domain.
3.3.2 SSP Modulation Scheme and BB84 Protocol
The complete system includes an interferometer on Alice’s side and another on Bob’s side
with initial bias phase set to Ψ1 and Ψ2, see Figure 47. After two interferences, the result-
















(b) Three Pulses Sequence.
Figure 46: Pulse sequence bearing the quantum information. E1 is the initial laser signal
amplitude envelope, E2 is the pulse sequence signal amplitude envelope of Alice’s output,
and E3 is the signal envelope after a second modulation.






Figure 47: SSP Principle
They system presents the same constraints as Equation (66) and Equation (67) on the
operating points Ψ1 and Ψ2. Alice and Bob set their operating point with Ψ1 = π/4 and
Ψ2 = −π/4.
The resulting side pulses amplitude i′δ2 and i
∗




















where iδ2 is the amplitude of the central pulse and ∆Φ = Φ2 − Φ1 is the phase difference
between Alice’s and Bob’s command signal, see Figure 48. The detection of the side pulses
is performed by measuring the photon arrival time compared to the main pulse arrival time.

























(c) Signal E3 with ∆Φ =
±π/2.
Figure 48: Single side pulse (SSP) modulation time plots for different relative phase differ-
ence ∆Φ.
propagation compare to the SSB system. For the SSB system, multiple frequency signal is
traveling on the same fiber. Thus, their relative phase is changing along with light path
fluctuations. The SSP system in insensitive to this effect as the pulse stream is at the same
optical frequency. The remaining constraint for accurate interference is to keep the delay
line L constant.
The energy level is lowered to obtain less than photon level energy in total energy in the
sidebands. This benefits from the quantum properties, especially the non cloning theorem
and the non orthogonality of all encoded states.
3.3.3 Quantum Interpretation of the SSP Scheme
When the energy is strongly lowered, the above behavior remains unchanged. Fainted light
pulses are modeled with Coherent states (Glauber states) or quasi-classical states.
As the classical description remains and the amplitudes of side pulses are in phase
opposition, it is possible to implement the BB84 protocol the same way as described in [35],
see Table 7.
As for the SSB scheme, there is a correspondence between the system variable and the
qubit manipulation used in the BB84 protocol. The correspondence for the initial phases Φ1
and the initial basis and state choice |u0〉, |u1〉, |v0〉, or |v1〉 is the same as for Equation (78).









as for Equation (79).
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Table 7: BB84 Protocol with SSP interference scheme. The black disks are for 100% pulse
detection, nothing for no detection, and white disks for unknown detection on either the











0 0 • 0
π/2 π/2 ◦ ◦
B2 π/2
0 0 • 0
π/2 π/2 ◦ ◦
1
B1 π
0 π • 1
π/2 −π/2 ◦ ◦
B2 −π/2
0 π • 1
π/2 −π/2 ◦ ◦























3.4 Multiplexing of SSB and SSP Techniques
As the SSP and SSB schemes rely on the time and frequency domains, we can implement
both encoding at the same time.
3.4.1 Multiplexing and Demultiplexing Structures
The channel is split in two where each SSB and SSP modulators are used to encode the
information, and the lines are then recombined, see Figure 50(a). In order to add up the







The resulting signal shows two side bands and two side pulses, see Figure 49. These two
pairs are separated and independent. The traveling wave carries information on the relative
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phase difference between the main peak/pulse and side bands in the frequency domain and














(b) Demultiplexing to recover in-
formation
Figure 50: Multiplexing encoding principle of both SSB and SSP on the same channel
For demultiplexing, Bob uses first an MZI to recover the information encoded in the
frequency domain with the SSB technique. Then, the pulse is sent through a SSP time
modulator to recover the information encoded in the time domain, see Figure 50(b).
3.4.2 Enhanced Throughput
After filtering and measurement, it is possible to extract the information from both the
SSB and the SSP encoding techniques. Alice and Bob share twice the information as they
would have with only the SSB or the SSP technique. The secure bit rate, i.e., the secure
information that is sent and share between the emitter and the receiver in one pulse, is then
doubled.
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3.5 BB84 Protocol with Reference Security with a Fainted
Laser
The BB84 protocol security relies mostly on the use of single photon sources. The mod-
ulation technique relies on pulses whose sidebands behave like a multiphoton source that
is highly attenuated. Each pulse includes a signal that is use as a reference for phase. In
this section, we describe that this strong pulse may be utilized as a strong reference [40] as
described in Section 2.3.2.
This signal at frequency ω0 may be considered as a reference when the two following
conditions are fulfilled:
1. Reference must always be detected with the signal.
2. Reference must be linked with the signal. It should not be possible to have a reference
signal without information signal.
Condition (1) is obviously fulfilled for any relative phase difference ∆Φ as the central
peak is always present in the frequency domain. Condition (2) requires more specific atten-
tion. It is necessary to check that the eavesdropper cannot create a signal with the reference
and no information signal, i.e., a signal that includes the central peak and no sideband once
Bob’s remodulates the signal. We call such signal a zero-photon signal.
Matrix expression of frequency modulation. At our operating conditions, MZI mod-
ulators have a linear behavior, thus, it is possible to apply linear algebra to model their
behavior. We will work in the vector spaces of frequencies ω0 + kΩ, that is the cen-
tral frequency ω0 and all harmonics separated by Ω from the central frequency. Then, a
vector
(
. . . x2 x1 x0 x−1 x−2 . . .
)T
represents the signal amplitude at frequencies
. . . , ω0 − 2Ω, ω0 − Ω, ω0, ω0 + Ω, ω0 + 2Ω, . . . .



















































The MZI behavior does not depend on the central optical peak frequency. As the modulator

















2(1 + ejΨ) jmej(Φ+Ψ) 0
−jmej(−Φ+Ψ) 2(1 + ejΨ) jmej(Φ+Ψ)
































































Each output yk depends on the value of three input signals xk−1, xk, et xk+1. We can











3.5.0.1 Building a zero-photon signal with an MZI
In this section, we determine when the eavesdropper is able to generate a zero-photon signal.
We are constructing a signal such that Bob, after modulation, will always detect with the
reference, but will never detect any signal on the sidebands. We assume that Alice uses a
modulation depth m that is very low. Bob will apply a modulation with low modulation
depth to generate destructive interferences on first order sidebands. Eve generates a signal







The signal, after Bob’s modulation, must not include any energy at frequency ω0 + Ω
and ω0 −Ω when Bob uses phase 0 and π/2. Moreover, central peak amplitude must be of


























































































































































































This predetermined system has five unknowns and six equations. It is overdetermined





















































































m2 −2m 0 0 0
−2m 8 +m2 −2m(1 − j) 0 0
0 −2m(1 + j) 8 + 2m2 −2m(1 − j) 0
0 0 −2m(1 + j) 8m2 2m















































































The matrix AHA is of rank 5, it is then possible to invert it to obtain matrix (AHA)−1.




























































































































































































































This solution is presented in Figure 51(a) and the corresponding Bob’s output in Figure 51(b).
One can notice that the solution is perfect; Bob will detect exactly 0 on both sidebands.
1 ω0 − 2Ω
ω0 − Ωω0 − Ω
ω0
ω0 + 2Ω
(a) Zero-photon signal generated by Eve.
1 ω0 − 2Ω
ω0 − Ωω0 − Ω
ω0
ω0 + 2Ω
(b) Bob’s modulator output. The spectrum
is identical for Φ = 0 and Φ = π/2.
Figure 51: Zero-Photon Signal
Under this condition, the protocol does not really have a reference. In the following
section we will show how to prevent Eve to be able to generate a zero-photon signal.
3.5.1 Blocking a Zero-Photon Signal
3.5.1.1 Blocking with higher harmonics detectors
One can observe the signal at Bob’s modulator output includes second order harmonics
ω0 ± 2Ω of same amplitude order as the central peak. One solution to prevent Eve from
building such a signal is to add two additional detectors at frequencies ω0−2Ω and ω0 +2Ω.
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When Bob detects some energy at these frequencies, Eve may be in the channel. Alice and
Bob should stop communication.
Eve may use further orders harmonics, i.e., 3, 4, or further if necessary to eliminate














































































































































































































































































































In the same manner, one can solve the system AHAX = AHB. The inverse (AHA)−1













































































































































































































































































































































































































































The best signal generated by Eve leaves a remaining component of order m/4 on each
first order sideband. This will create errors and Eve will be revealed. To have third order
harmonics contributing to cancel signal at frequencies ω0 ± 2Ω, Eve must consider the









−2jΦ2 −α1e−jΦ2 α0 α1ejΦ2 α2e2jΦ2 0 0
0 α2e
−2jΦ2 −α1e−jΦ2 α0 α1ejΦ2 α2e2jΦ2 0
0 0 α2e















4 − 4j + jm2
8
.




































































































α2 −α1 α0 α1 α2 0 0 0 0
−α2 −jα1 α0 jα1 −α2 0 0 0 0
0 α2 −α1 α0 α1 α2 0 0 0
0 −α2 −jα1 α0 jα1 −α2 0 0 0
0 0 α2 −α1 α0 α1 α2 0 0
0 0 −α2 −jα1 α0 jα1 −α2 0 0
0 0 0 α2 −α1 α0 α1 α2 0
0 0 0 −α2 −jα1 α0 jα1 −α2 0
0 0 0 0 α2 −α1 α0 α1 α2












































































































































































, and α0 =
4 − 4j + jm2
8
.
In the same manner, one can solve the AHAX = AHB system.

















































































































































Figure 52: Eve’s signal spectrum amplitude for m = 0.5.













































































































































































































Bob obtains a signal where second order harmonics are zero for φ2 ∈ {0, π/2}. Although,
it is important to notice that Eve needs to generate a signal with amplitude 1/m2, that
may then be very high for a very small m. Bob may perform an energy measurement on
the whole signal, thus detecting the high average energy generated by Eve.
Bob has the possibility to implement additional detectors on higher harmonics, making it
harder for Eve the generation of a zero-photon signal. She has to use even higher harmonics,
thus producing a very high energy signal that is then easily detectable by Bob.
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3.5.1.2 Enhancing the BB84 Protocol
A more elegant solution than adding detectors on harmonics is to take advantage of the
easy structure of the SSB system. It is easy for Bob to modify the modulator phase values
to π or −π/2 without modifying the system. Choosing Φ2 = π is equivalent for Bob to
choose phase Φ2 = 0 and swapping the sideband signal. Then, bit 0 may be detected on
the detector D−, and bit 1 on detector D+ respectively. Table 6 is modified into Table 8.
Table 8: Enhance BB84 protocol for SSB system.
Alice’s Bit Alice Φ1 Bob Φ2 Difference ∆Φ D
+ D− Shared Bit
1 0
0 0  1
+π/2 +π/2   -
π π   -
−π/2 −π/2  1
0 π
0 π  0
+π/2 −π/2   -
π 0  0
−π/2 +π/2   -
1 +π/2
0 −π/2   -
+π/2 0  1
π +π/2   -
−π/2 π  1
0 −π/2
0 +π/2   -
+π/2 π  0
π −π/2   -
−π/2 0  0
This enhanced BB84 protocol version enables communication with only one detector,
as detector D+ and D− are able to detect each bit 0 and 1.
Bob’s choice for Φ2 is among four possible values 0, +π/2, π, and −π/2. The number of
constraints for Eve to generate a zero-photon pulse doubles. Then, to cancel the quantum
information first harmonics, as Bob chooses among four phase values, Eve has to zero eight
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As previously, a remaining component of order m/4 is left on each sidebands, this will
create errors for Bob’s detection. Eve will be detected. It is then necessary for Eve to
proceed with further order harmonics. By using the expansion in m2 for Bob’s modulator,






































α2 −α1 α0 α+1 α+2 0 0
−α2 jα1 α0 jα+1 −α+2 0 0
α2 α1 α0 −α+1 α+2 0 0
−α2 −jα1 α0 −jα+1 −α+2 0 0
0 α2 −α1 α0 α+1 α+2 0
0 −α2 jα1 α0 jα+1 −α+2 0
0 α2 α1 α0 −α+1 α+2 0
0 −α2 −jα1 α0 −jα+1 −α+2 0
0 0 α2 −α1 α0 α+1 α+2
0 0 −α2 jα1 α0 jα+1 −α+2
0 0 α2 α1 α0 −α+1 α+2





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8(1 − j) + 2m2
8(1 − j) + 2m2
8(1 − j) + 2m2












































































































































































Am/4 component remains on each sideband. In the same manner, any higher harmonics
will not be able to eliminate this remain that creates detection errors on Bob’s end.
By using four phase values, Bob makes the SSB system resistant against the PNS attack
because Eve is not able to create a zero-photon signal without leaving a residual error that
leads to false detections on Bob’s side. Eve will be revealed during the comparison phase
because the key error rate will have increased. Then, as described in Section 2.3.2 and
thanks to a strong reference use, Alice is able to use a laser source with an average energy
of µ = 1 phton/pulse. Alice and Bob then proceed to a privacy amplification step to
eliminate the remaining information known by Eve.
3.5.2 Attenuated Reference with Propagation
As the reference is an optical signal, it is also attenuated. Eve could use this imperfection
to increase the amount of information that she may gain. Let us suppose that the strong
reference has an initial energy Eref, and is attenuated during transmission with a coefficient
10−
αd
10 , where α is the fiber attenuation.
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When Bob is at a distance d from Alice such as 10−
αd
10 · Eref > 1, then Bob may detect
the reference signal amplitude and then verify that Eve does not create any zero-photon
signal.
When the signal energy is less than one photon per pulse, Bob may only perform a
statistical analysis on the detected photon over the total pulses. When the average pulse
number awaited by Bob is η, Eve may take advantage to generate an optimum signal that
generates the least amount of errors, containing exactly one photon in the reference signal
over η pulses. The other pulses, 1−η, are blocked. They do not contain any signal. Though,
in this case, Bob may notice that he does not receive any reference signal. Moreover, if Eve
does not a priori know the encoding basis, she will create errors in the bit string shared by
Alice and Bob.
For example, if reference amplitude is 0.2 photon per pulse at Bob’s detector, Eve creates
an optimum signal on 20% of the pulses, and no signal on 80%. Then, Eve generates only
20% of pulses and the overall generated error is only 25%*0.2 = 5% on attacked pulses.
Bob will have no information on the remaining bits.
3.6 Conclusion
The SSB system introduced by Duraffourg [22] described in this chapter is a simple quantum
key distribution modulation scheme with only two modulators. This modulation may either
be implemented with a standard MZI modulator at both the emission and reception sides,
or with a push-pull MZI modulator and a phase modulator. This configuration versatility
enables a broader flexibility for implementation. The use of phase encoding with multiple
frequencies permits less polarization sensitivity to optical fiber birefringence.
The SSP system that we introduced [34] and described in this thesis is built on the
same double modulation principle, but in the time domain. A three arm modulator adds
two information bearing side pulses to a single input pulse. A double modulation enables
the recovery of the information transmitted with the pulses. The BB84 protocol may then
be used with this encoding technique.
Both systems may be multiplexed for information encoding in the time and frequency
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domains [33]. The throughput is then increases for an identical pulse rate. This system
is the first described scheme that uses multiplexing to enhance quantum key distribution
secure throughput.
We showed that the addition of an extra detector to the central frequency enables the im-
plementation of the BB84 with reference protocol for both the SSB and SSP schemes [32, 33].
It is impossible for Eve to perform a PNS attack that consists of stealing one photon in mul-
tiphoton pulses, and to block single photon pulses. Eve cannot create a zero-photon pulse
that Bob would use to detect the reference without detecting the sideband signal. Moreover,
Bob may enhance his protocol by using four possible phase states in {0, π, π/2,−π/2}. The
best signal that Eve may generate introduces a remaining energy on both sidebands, which
produces a 25% probability to be detected by Bob, and finally a 12.5% error rate on the
final key. Thus, Eve may be discovered, as she introduces errors on the transmitted key.
It is possible to implement a prototype with off-the-shelf telecom items such as laser
diodes or modulators [35]. The initial average energy at Alice’s output may be tuned to one
photon per pulse. This is an important gain compared to existing QKD implementations
that use a fainted laser. We are going to study more precisely the implementation and
performance of this system in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SSB SYSTEM WITH
REFERENCE
The potential success of a new technology relies on its capacity to be integrated into think-
ing scheme, but mostly on the way to be easily and efficiently deployed at a decent cost.
Then, we have implemented a quantum key distribution system using SSB scheme with
standard telecom components. The security and performance in terms of rate and distance
are directly influenced by the transmission QBER. We will study in detail how the imple-
mentation of the system allowing to have a very low error rate, optimizing then the bit rate,
and allowing to guarantee stability over time.
The SSB principle implementation is first described in Section 4.1. Two MZI modula-
tors driven by a HF electric signal allow to obtain signals at frequencies ω0 −Ω and ω0 +Ω,
where the amplitudes varies in phase opposition, allowing to implement the BB84 proto-
col. Then, an automatization of the system may be implemented with a computer that
allow long encryption keys transmission over long periods of time, see Section 4.2. Then,
Section 4.3 presents a system that allows to synchronize the MZI modulations and then to
autocompensate any light path fluctuation. In Section 4.4, the implementation of a strong
reference detection is described, confirming the security over any transmission distance. Fi-
nally, results with complete system over fiber spools in laboratory are described, as well as
over deployed fiber, are described in Section 4.5.
4.1 Implementation of the SSB system (d=0km)
The quantum key distribution system using the SSP principle encodes the information on
the relative phase difference between an optical signal at frequency ω0 and its modulation
sidebands at frequencies ω0 ±Ω. To implement the system, two oscillators, synchronized at
frequency Ω, drive two MZIs on Alice and Bob’s sides. This modulation may also be done
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with a phase modulator and a push-pull MZI. This last configuration allows in a practical
point of view an easier tuning of working points. This is the configuration that will be used
in our implemented prototype.
Let us recall the SSB principle, see Figure 53. The MZIs bias voltage correspond to
phases Ψ1 = π/2 and Ψ2 = −π/2. The Alice and Bob’s output signals are:
EAlice = E0e
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Figure 53: SSB principle implementation.
Each variable from the theoretical SSB principle description, such as ω0, Ω, Φ1, Φ2,
Ψ1, Ψ2, E0, have to be chosen very precisely and rigorously. The implementation is split
in blocks: first block includes the optical line, i.e., the laser diode and MZI modulators,
see Section 4.1.1. The second block includes the HF electric line that drives the MZIs, see
Section 4.1.2. Finally, the filtering and signal detection at frequencies ω0 + Ω and ω0 −Ω is




The implemented system is designed to work on optical fibers for a wavelength in the 1550nm
order, allowing benefiting from all the today’s available technology of standard telecom. A
1547.43nm laser diode is used. It has a 5MHz ray thickness, which is thin enough to be
able to use the SSB modulation scheme.
4.1.1.2 Optical signal modulation - MZI
The used modulator is an electro-absorbent directly integrated ahead the laser diode. The
modulators bandwidth is about 5GHz. We then can use a 2GHz modulation frequency Ω.
The modulation depth may be determined with the modulation electric signal power.
4.1.1.3 Attenuators at the source
The system includes a programmable attenuator that allows one to quickly and easily switch
from classical mode, where Alice sends an average energy of 1 milliwatt per pulse, to the
quantum mode, where Alice sends a signal with about one photon per pulse on average in
both sidebands.
4.1.2 Modulation HF Circuit
4.1.2.1 Synchronization et stability
The hyper frequency circuit includes the main oscillator. We use a tunable Anritsu gen-
erator. To be able to precisely tune the initial phase shift Φ1 of the signal at frequency
Ω = 2GHz, we use an electric phase shifter driven by a continuous voltage.
First, Bob’s oscillator at frequency Ω is the same as Alice’s, guaranteeing de facto their
synchronization.
4.1.3 Filtering and Measure
4.1.3.1 Filters for D+ and D−
To separate frequencies ω0−Ω and ω0−Ω, we use a Fabry-Pérot fibered filter that presents
2dB losses, a 100GHz ISL, a finesse of 100, and a resolution of 100MHz.
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4.1.3.2 Quantum Detection
To detect the incident photon, a heavily cooled avalanche photodiode system is used. An
incident photon on the avalanche diode (APD) produces in the device an avalanche phe-
nomena that creates a macroscopic and detectable current, see Figure 54(b).
The diode EPITAXX EPM 239 may work at temperatures in the -60 to -40 range
that my be obtained thanks to a three stages Peltier module, see Figure 54(a). The module
is glued on its cold side to a metal block for thermal inertia in which is sticked the APD and
a thermal probe PT1000. The Peltier hot side is glued to a radiator and a fan to dissipate
produced heat and to maintain the radiator at room temperature, see Figure 54(a). To
maintain the temperature constant, a PID control is built on the Peltier with an external
circuit. The measured temperature fluctuations are in the 0.1 order when the diode is in









(b) Detected Current for the Diode.
Figure 54: Photodiode and detected current.
Dark count hits create errors and lowers drastically the maximum attainable distance.
It is possible to reduce the noise errors by placing the diode in a state where it can create
an avalanche only during a useful window, i.e., only when the diode is supposed to receive
an pulse incident photon. The precision of the clock sent by Alice is ±500ps, allowing to
precisely set a gate of 1ns broader than the pulse. This mode is called active gating. The
polarization voltage is modulated around a given value VA = 50, 1V, slightly below the
breakdown voltage VB = 48V . The modulation voltage is made of detection gates that last
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τgate = 8ns, which is over the optical pulse duration time τopt = 7ns, see Figure 55. The
diode polarization voltage becomes temporarily greater than the breakdown voltage, which
allows the avalanche when there is an incident photon. The voltage VB allows the diode to














Figure 55: APD photon detection chronogram.
An unwanted effect with the APD is the after pulses. These are pulses that appear
when the diode did not had time to relax its material from all electrons, creating then an
unwanted avalanche. For a -55 temperature, the after pulsing is about 2% for a relaxing
time of 1µs. The diode is then used at a 1MHz frequency. The relaxation time imposes a
strong limitation on the emission rate and bit reception, thus limiting the final key rate.
4.1.4 Principle global test - Visibility
The SSB global system is built on two different tables for Alice, see Figure 56(a) and for
Bob, see Figure 56(b).
The used configuration allows one to verify the sidebands behavior as a function of
phase difference ∆Φ between emitter and receiver oscillators. A Fabry-Pérot filter is used
as spectrum analyzer by applying a variable voltage to shift the filtering central frequency.
One can then observe the signal spectrum amplitude, see Figure 57. The Figure 57(b) and
Figure 57(c) represent Bob’s output when phase difference ∆Φ is 0 or π. Measured visibility
is then 99% and stays at this level in any working mode.
Then, it is possible to apply the SSB principle to perform quantum key distribution
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(a) Alice’s apparatus (b) Bob’s apparatus
Figure 56: SSB principle quantum key distribution prototype.
(a) ∆Φ = ±π/2 (b) ∆Φ = 0 (c) ∆Φ = π
Figure 57: Signal spectral density in classical mode for different phase difference values
∆Φ. The observed visibility is about 99%.
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between Alice and Bob.
4.2 Automatic bit generation and counting
To implement the SSB principle in an efficient manner, it is important to perform the
information encoding and measurement with computer driven apparatus. Two elements
should be taken into account to have an efficient transmission management: hardware
interfaces and compatible software.
Digital data acquisition and generation from National Instrument (NI) are to be installed
in computers and allow one to generate a driving signal and to acquire measurement results
for long bit string transmissions. The interfaces between prototype elements and NI cards
are described in Section 4.2.1. Then the Labview software1, today’s standard in many
research laboratories, presents many advantages that may be use in our experiment. This
tool is installed in computers that include NI cards and allow one to control prototype
driving signals, see Section 4.2.2.
4.2.1 Hardware interfaces
4.2.1.1 QPSK commands
The information encoding is done by choosing the phase Φ1, i.e., the oscillator initial phase
at frequency Ω, that drives MZI1, see Figure 53. Phase Φ1 is chosen among four possible
values 0, π/2, π, and −π/2 thanks to a PULSAR MT-B6-0233 quadrature phase shift
keying modulator (QPSK) driven by two signals D1 and D2 with a ±20mA current, see
Figure 58(a).
To drive the QPSK module with a computer binary signal at frequency in the MHz
range, we have chosen a National Instrument PCI6534 card. Output signals are TTL
format (0-5V). We have then built an interfacing card ±20mA ↔ 0− 5V, see Figure 58(b).
It allows also to quickly adapt the PCI card SCSI connectors and the PQSK module SMA
ports.
































(b) Electronic drawing for QPSK card
Figure 58: QPSK modulator principle. The QPSK modulators reference is Pulsar MT-B6-
0233.
4.2.1.2 Detection and counting
The photon detection within the pulses is made thanks to a previously described avalanche
photodiode, see Section 4.1.3.2. The data acquisition is performed thanks to a National
Instrument PCI6024E computer card interfaced with multi stage electronics, including a




















































































































































































































































































Figure 59: APD electronic design for APD pulses detection.
The photon detection at very specific times allow one to activate photon detectors at
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also very precise time windows, highly lowering false detections, the dark count, inducted
by the APDs, see Section 4.1.3.2, thus increasing the observed QBER. A clock signal is
generated by Alice and transmitted to Bob to synchronize the pulse generation and the
information encoding.
4.2.2 Software interface
The NI cards may be driven from different computer programs. The Labview software
presents a graphical interface for simple and direct application design and extension card
control. The NI cards commands, thanks to C++ programs, allow one to build program
modules that may be then integrated in larger programs.
The program developed with Labview includes two windows. The first one, the front
panel, is the final interface with which the operator interacts in front of the computer. This
window includes indicators, push buttons, and value fields to enter commands. The second
one, the back panel, is the program schematic, the program core. It shows how the different
indicators interact with the NI cards for example.
4.2.2.1 QPSK control
The PCI6534 card command program allows one to generate many TTL digital signals.
Two signals are generated for the QPSK command and a third signal is used as clock signal
to allow synchronization for pulse detection on Bob’s side. A chronogram of the three




Figure 60: Chronogram of the QPSK command signals. H is the clock signal, O1 et O2
are the QPSK command signals.
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A random bit string generation module is implemented and ”encapsulated” in a labview
subprogram. The front panel includes indicators (-) and commands (*) to control the




- bit numbers in the bit string
* On/Off for bit string randomness
* On/Off for the bases randomness
* On/Off to activate the clock signal
* On/Off for bit string saving
The back panel includes the command bock chain for the NI cards, as well as the bit
string building chain, see Figure 61(b). The program includes also the possibility to save
the bit string to proceed the following classical reconciliation steps afterward. One can
notice the clock signal generated by the program.
4.2.2.2 Detection control
The pulse counting from the APD interfacing circuit is a simple operation that is then done
by a simple program. The clock count between each pulse from the diode is saved. Then,
we can deduce the arrival time for each pulse, see Figure 62. The program includes also a
button that allows to save the results, i.e., the detected pulses positions.
4.2.3 Global test for generation and bit counting
In the experiment, with an initial 1MHz rate, the clock signal transmitted by Alice allows
Bob to synchronize his QPSK command signal. The signal rising edges indicate a bit slot
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(b) Program design on the back panel.
Figure 61: QPSK labview command.
3
device For instructions
select Show VI Info


















Note: This example uses the default source and gate 















wait until counter is unarmed
Source Selection
reset 1












(b) Program design on the back panel.
Figure 62: Compting labview command
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that correspond either to the bit or the next basis, see Figure 60. The clock allows also the
counting card to count the bit slot number that correspond to the gray parts, see Figure 60.
For each bit slot, the QPSK control value stays the same, allowing the 8ns optical pulse to
be positioned anywhere in 1µs slot.
The limitation for the temporal synchronization is based on the precision of the clock
signal transmission. The signal recuperation is performed with the synchronization signal
envelope detection, see Figure 63(a). As the detector bandwidth is limited, it is not possible
to obtain a perfect square signal. The clock signal rising edges are less sharp, which inducts
a drift in the clock tics detection within the 1ns range, see Figure 63(b). The small drift
allows one to implement 10ns long detection windows for 8ns long pulses.
(a) HF Signal modulated by the clock signal. (b) Detection drift for clock signal.
Figure 63: Clock signal
The bit strings used to encode the bits and phases by Alice, as well as the Bob’s bases
bit string and bit detection string, are saved to perform transmission reconciliation and
to extract finally a secret bit string. Bob sends to Alice on the public channel the bit
times where he has detected a photon. Alice tells him then what bases she used to encode
information in the pulses. Alice and Bob perform a transmission in classical mode to test
the apparatus, see Figure 64. They keep only the bits where the basis match, see Table 9.
The public comparison is made on the public channel. Alice and Bob share about
20% of the key on the public channel to evaluate the quantum bit error rate QBERapprox.
With this estimation, they implement an adapted error correction. The exchanges for
the reconciliation and error correction are directly implemented in a C++ software. It is
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Figure 64: QPSK modulation test
Table 9: Bit reconciliation between Alice and Bob.  shows non matching basis, Y shows
matching basis.
Alice Basis 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
Alice Bits 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
Bob Bases 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Bob Bit Detection 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Matching Basis  Y      Y Y     Y   Y
Shared Bit 0 1 1 1 0
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possible then to develop the NI cards interfacing with C++ for signal generation and pulse
counting. This allows one to have a single program for the whole application.
4.3 Propagation and optical path fluctuation compensation
The quantum channel between Alice and Bob is an optical fiber. It is then very sensitive
to external variations, and most precisely temperature variation that make the fiber length
change, changing the optical path length as well.
When considering the propagation constant β0 for frequency ω0, it becomes β(ω) for a
frequency ω close to ω0 [2]:
β(ω) = β0 + β1(ω − ω0) +
β2
2
(ω − ω0)2. (114)
Propagation is indeed different for different frequencies. This does influence our system as
the SSB scheme relies on a multiple frequency signal. Though, this propagation difference
may be corrected at the first order. An auto-compensation signal that travels through the
same medium is deformed with the same constraints as the quantum signal. The exact use
of this signal is described in Section 4.3.1. This signal allows a very high stability of the
experiment over time, see Section 4.3.2.
One may notice that our system does not use or depend on polarization of the optical
signal. Though some of the device we are using, such as the MZIs, have an efficiency that
is sensitive to the input signal polarization. We have then implemented a system to control
the polarization variations over time, see Section 4.3.3.
4.3.1 Theoretical description of the auto compensation technique
4.3.1.1 Signal and propagation
When one considers a multiple frequency signal that propagates on a fiber, one should take





where E0 is the signal real amplitude, and A(t) its complexe phase. After propagation over













Alice and Bob are located at a distance l from each other. When we consider this
distance to be constant, l = l0, all signal phases rotate by β0l. Moreover, the relative phase
difference between the central peak and its sidebands is −β1Ωl0 for frequency ω0 + Ω, and
is β1Ωl0 for ω0 − Ω at first order. Then, on may consider that phase encoded in the signal
is Φ′1 = Φ1 − β1Ωl0. Though, this may be exactly compensated at emitter or receiver. The
unbalanced rest is due to the β2 constant and may be neglected here.
The signal at Alice’s modulator output is propagating in the fiber, see Equation (110).



















One may observe that the relative phase difference between the central peak and the side-































































































To compare the system in an homogeneous manner, it is possible to measure the visibility






The system is tuned to have maximum visibility for l = l0. We consider distance fluctuations
with l = l0+δl. The terms imax and imin are defined for ∆Φ−β1Ωl0 = 0 et ∆Φ−β1Ωl0 = π.
Considering β1 ≫ β2Ω, each sideband visibility is then:
Vω0+Ω = cos (β1Ωδl) , (122)
Vω0−Ω = cos (β1Ωδl) . (123)
The visibility drift is very important with the optical path fluctuations. With a standard
fiber and a frequency Ω = 2GHz, the coefficient β1Ω is about 60 rad/m. With such value,
one must maintain the fiber length within a 0.1 mm range. This is extremely difficult over
long fiber distances. One may notice that visibility do not depend on the modulation depth
m.
4.3.1.2 First order drift auto-compensation.
It is possible to obtain a tremendous increase for the visibility by compensating the phase
difference due to optical path fluctuations. This may be done by using a phase reference
signal propagating in the same fiber at a very close wavelength. This signal follows the
same optical path fluctuations and then may be used to compensate the information signal
at frequency ω0
An optical field is produced by a laser diode at frequency ω0. This signal is modulated
with an MZI driven by the same HF signal than the quantum line, at frequency Ω =2GHz.
The multiplexed signal is transmitted on the same optical fiber as the quantum channel,
and will thus follow the same perturbations. This signal is then extracted and detected to
obtain the HF electrical signal to modulated the quantum channel, see Figure 65.
The synchronization optical signal is of the same form as Alice’s quantum signal, see
Equation (110). Then amplitude modulation detection of the optical signal after propaga-
tion generates a signal of form:







where a is a coefficient that depends on the detector efficiency and the signal amplification.





























Figure 65: Synchronization system.
on its fluctuations as well. This signal is used to directly modulate Bob’s MZI, MZI2. Bob’s
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) . The phase speed difference may be approximated as follows:
(β1 − β1s)Ωl ≈ (ω0 − ωs)β2Ωl. (127)
Then, in the same fashion, visibility is as follows:
Vω0+Ω = cos (β2ΩΛδl) , (128)
Vω0−Ω = cos (β2ΩΛδl) , (129)
where Λ = ω−ωs. The visibility is now much less sensitive to the optical path fluctuations
δl.
4.3.2 Auto compensation implementation and test
The synchronization signal is generated by a direct modulation laser diode at wavelength
ωs = 1552.43nm, that is 5nm distant from the quantum channel. The signal energy is
lowered down to 600µW so is enough to be detected after tens of kilometers without creating
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”crosstalk” with the quantum signal. The optical signal is then added to the quantum signal
thanks to a mixer.
On Bob’s side, the quantum signal and the synchronization signal are separated by an
add & drop filter. The synchronization signal at frequency ωs is detected by an envelope
detector to extract the signal at frequency Ω. This last electric signal is transmitted through
a QPSK whose phase switches between {0, π/2, π,−π/2}. This signal is used to drive the
modulator of the quantum signal, compensating eventually the phase drift due to optical
path difference, as described in Section 4.3.
The synchronization signal from Alice’s oscillators is also used to transmit the pulses
temporal synchronization. The optical carrier at frequency ωs is modulated by the HF
signal. It is also amplitude modulated by a square shape clock signal whose frequency is the
pulse rate 1MHz. The signal that modulates Alice’s MZI for synchronization is represented
on Figure 66(a). The optical signal received by Bob goes through a power splitter and then
a mixer that allows detecting the square envelope at clock frequency. The clock signal is
used by Bob to synchronize the signal generation to control the QPSK and to regulate very
precisely the active gating and photon detection.
The clock signal is used to trigger the pulse generation by Alice that is located about
at the middle of the bit slot, see Figure 66(b). Then, as the pulses and the clock signal
propagate on the same fiber, the clock signal allows to determine exactly the pulse temporal
position. The detection gates are set very precisely just around the pulses, see Figure 66(b),
lowering by much the detection errors.
(a) Synchronization signal modula-
tion.
Imp. 1 Imp. 2 Imp. 3




(b) Clock signal transmission principle.
Figure 66: Clock signal transmission.
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The result of the amelioration with the auto-compensation system is described in Figure 67.
The experimental results are obtained by simply adding some optical path lengths thanks
to a fibered delay line for lengths from 1mm to 10cm in free space, and optical fiber pieces
from 1m to 60m. Though we did not reach 99% visibility, we showed that visibility is not
















Figure 67: Signal visibility with and without synchronization. The visibility without syn-
chronization is represented in dashed line, and the visibility with synchronization is rep-
resented in plain line. The visibility gain with the synchronization line is of many decade
orders.
4.3.3 Polarization
The polarization in an optical fiber is a difficult variable to control. Though the SSB
principle is not sensitive to input polarization, the physical devices are sensitive to input
polarization. The MZI modulators are in Lithium Niobate, LiNbO3. They are in Z cut to
have low losses, but need to have the input polarization aligned along this cut.
The system visibility depends practically on the polarization control. The quantum line
polarization may evolve over time, and decreasing the visibility. Though, the synchroniza-
tion signal suffers the same polarization fluctuations, it may then be used as polarization
reference to track the drift on the quantum line.
The polarization is measured on the synchronization line, and the correction is applied
on the quantum line. A polarization controller applies two rotations on the polarization,
see Figure 68. One may notice that two rotations are necessary to correct any variation.
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Figure 68: Stokes vector visualization in the Bloch ball.
The polarization active control is realized with Labview, see Figure 69. A stokes vector
visualization in the Poincaré sphere allows one to apply the desired control.
The active polarization control allows one to correct the polarization variations that have
a frequency up to tens of Hertz. Polarization rotation angles to be applied as correction are
tabulated in a separated library, programmed in C++ to increase performance.
4.4 Reference Implementation
The SSB system uses a fainted laser diode as photon generator. It is thus sensitive to
the PNS attack. Though, it is possible to implement the central peak detection as strong
reference to make the system resistant against the PNS attack. The system modification
to detect the reference signal at frequency ω0 is described in Section 4.4.1.
4.4.1 Hardware modification for reference detection
The strong reference signal detection is performed by modifying the system to add a filtering
at frequency ω0. A circulator is added right before the second frequency ω0 + Ω detection,
then a quantum or classical detector is used, as a function of the signal awaited power, see
Figure 70.
4.5 Final results, transmission, and performance
The global system is implemented and tested on fiber spools for distances of tens of kilo-
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Figure 70: Apparatus for reference detection
security, the observed error rate, the QBER, must be lower than 15%.
4.5.1 Transmission and QBER
The transmission error rate is measured as a function of distance. It is defined as the ratio of
errors detected over effective detected bits. The theoretical quantum error rate QBERtheo.




· (1 − V )Psignal + Pdark
Pdark + Psignal
, (130)
where Psignal = 1 − eµηT is the awaited probability of counts, µ = photon per pulse is the
average power at Alice’s output, η is the detector quantum efficiency, T = 2.8dB is the
overall losses due to the receptor and transmission losses, V = 98% is the visibility, and
Pdark = 8 · 10−6 is the dark count probability. The QBER as a function of the distance is
showed on Figure 71(a). The measured visibility is 98% and the fiber losses are 0.25dB/km.
4.5.2 Comparison with existing systems
The British Telecom group has developed a system where the encoding relies on the phase
difference between two time separated pulses thanks to a strongly unbalanced interferom-
eter. Though, this system is very sensitive to external disturbance such as temperature of
vibrations.
The Los Alamos group presents a close system where the phase encoding is used in the
time domain, with similar results over 48km distance.
The Geneva group has developed their Plug&Play system as described earlier. They

















(a) Quantum error rate QBER as a function of dis-
tance d in km.
(b) Deployed fiber over the Technople area.
Figure 71: Error rate and deployed fiber.
The NEC Lab group showed that a single photon interference over 100km with using an
unbalanced detector in active gating mode and a Plug&Play system for transmission. The
visibility with 0.1 photon per pulse is over 80% after 100km. This corresponds to fidelity
of a cryptographic system of more that 90% and a QBER of less than 10%, satisfying the
security criteria to extract a secret key.
The Toshiba UK group uses a phase modulation system with a Mach-Zehnder system.
The final rate is 15Hz for a 101km distance.
All these results are tabulated in Table 10.
Research group λ (nm) d (km) µ F (kHz) Draw (Hz) Q (%)
B.T [65] 1300 25 0,15 1000 500 2
Los Alamos [37] 1300 48 0,63 100 20 9,3
Genve [63] 1550 67 0,2 5000 160 5,6
Nec Lab. [44] 1550 100 0,2 500 5.5 10
Toshiba [75] 1550 101 0,1 500 15 7,1
G.T.L. [35] 1550 40 0,2 1000 40 3
G.T.L. (Avec strong reference) 1550 120 1 1000 1000 8
Table 10: Experimental results of other groups.
With commercially available components, our system compares favorably with other
quantum key distribution systems.
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4.5.3 Secure bit rate measure
This error rate directly influences the final key rate. Thus, it is computed as a function of
the transmission distance, see Figure 72.
From Shannon’s theory, the key rate after error correction is [63]:
Dnet ≈
(
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Figure 72: Final key rate as a function of distance.
One may observe that the transmission key rate drops only slightly until 100km distance.
It is realistic to consider that a transmission may be realized over 120km fiber distance.
4.6 Conclusion
Practical aspects of the QKD prototype implementation have to be considered very pre-
cisely to guarantee performance close to theory. Particularly, the system performances are
optimized to maximize Bob’s detector visibility in non-quantum mode. The error rate is
mainly linked to the APD dark count. The detection gates duration is lowered to the max-
imum to avoid false detections. It may also be verified that interference between multiple
frequency signals may be considered as negligible.
The system stability core is the oscillators’ synchronization and the detection windows.
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A new technique has been implemented to compensate temporal fluctuations of the quantum
channel. The optical path fluctuations between Alice and Bob, due to physical environment
variations, are compensated exactly at first order with the autocompensation. A signal is
sent on the same optical fiber with a slightly different wavelength to compensate exactly the
same optical path fluctuations, thus compensating the visibility fluctuations on the optical
phase. The theoretical aspects, practical implementation, and automatization have been
described.
The last contribution to this chapter relies on the strong reference QKD protocol im-
plementation. This system may then use a fainted laser source where the source may have
on average one photon per pulse. This strong power allows increasing the secure bit rate to
much higher rates and distances. The rate for very long distances is limited mainly when




Classical cryptography has developed information encryption algorithms very efficient for
theoretical security, but are harder to implement and slow to run. To guarantee transmission
confidentiality, this theoretical property relies on an encryption key that has to be kept
secret, i.e., known only by the authenticated parties. Public key algorithms are implemented
to transmit encryption keys, but their security relies on mathematical conjectures that could
be broken in the future. Thus, they cannot be fully trusted. Moreover, it is theoretically
impossible to generate secret with a classical channel, i.e., a channel that anybody may read
and copy. Quantum cryptography solvess this problem. It enables secret key transmission,
or secret growing between remote parties.
Quantum key distribution generates remotely a secret key between Alice and Bob. This
key may then be used, with the one time pad algorithm for example, to perform secure
transmission guaranteed by physical properties and information theory. Protocols are im-
plemented to use quantum uncertainty and enable the parties to share a secure key. Con-
trary to classical channel, the laws of physics imply that any eavesdropper listening to the
quantum transmission will modify this transmission and be detected. Quantum key distri-
bution protocols may use different quantum measurements to lead to complex protocols,
e.g., continuous variables protocols. The protocols used in the present work is built from
the original discrete variable BB84 protocol with improvements.
Sharing a secret key from a quantum transmission is possible, even in the presence of
noise. One need to apply privacy amplification as a function of the observed quantum bit
error rate (QBER) to generate a secret key between Alice and Bob. The security of QKD
methods may then be guaranteed below maximum threshold, QBER < 11.5%. Practicaly,
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imperfect devices open also a security breach. For example, imperfect single photon sources
such as fainted laser source, lead to an information leak due to multiphoton pulses. An
eavesdropper may steal the extra photons on the channel without being discovered. The
better possible attack in the photon number splitting attack (PNS). It implies a maximum
transmission distance for Alice, as a function of her initial average energy per pulse. There-
fore, QKD systems are required to use low energy level around 0.1-0.2 photon per pulse,
to make the leaked information very small. For a transmission over standard monomode
optical fiber and 0.2 photons per pulse, it is not possible to transmit a secure key beyond
the maximum distance d0 of about 62 km.
The variables used to encode the information in the photons are mainly polarization and
phase. The principle used by most apparatus relies on the relative phase difference between
two time separated pulses, like in a very long interferometer. To remove sensitivity over
time to physical fluctuations, the QKD system developed at GTL-CNRS Telecom uses the
SSB principle. The information encoding relies on the relative phase difference between a
main peak and its modulation side bands, i.e., the relative phase difference between signals
at different frequencies. The photon detection on one or the other modulation sideband
enables implementation on the BB84 protocol. The SSB principle was easily implemented
with standard off the shelf equipment such as MZIs or Fabry-Pérot filters.
The SSB principle security regarding resistance to transmission noise is inherited from
general quantum key transmission systems. As for standard QKD systems, it is not possible
to extract a secret key from the communication with over 11.5% QBER. We showed that
the presence of the central peak in our scheme, which is always present and with high
energy, may be considered as a strong reference. This signal guarantees the presence of a
pulse. Theoretically, the protocol we use now is a BB84 with reference protocol, where the
reference needs to be detected for each sent pulse. We showed by using a matrix format
for the modulation phenomena that this reference may exist in the pulse without energy on
the side pulses that carry information. Although, our system uses a fainted laser source as
single photon source approximation, the strong reference makes the system resistant to the
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PNS attack. It prevents an eavesdropper from blocking the pulses or from creating a zero
photon signal that would present the reference but no information signal.
The SSB system is secure for any distance and is not limited to d0. The energy that
maximizes the secure bit rate is one photon per pulse. This is a great improvement compared
to the commonly used 0.1 photon per pulse in current systems.
The built prototype enables transmission for distances over eighty kilometers. The light
path fluctuations auto-compensation system that we have implemented makes our system
very stable to the physical constraints on the transmission channel. We implemented this
autocompensation thanks to standard WMD technology components. Such devices reduce
the cost and the system benefits from their stability. Quantum key distribution use in the
third telecom window (1550 nm) opens the doors of high speed secure communication with
WDM technology for quantum cryptography.
The implemented automation showed a very strong stability. The computer control of
encoding variables enabled transmission over long period of time. The automation also
enables transmission of large keys, many megabytes in size, over tens of kilometers. The
observed performance for optical fiber spools, as well as for deployed fiber, validates the
principle on operational networks. The obtained rate and performance for stability of our
prototype lead one to consider this system to be implemented in an industry that need
hypersecure transmission over optical fibers.
The improvement on the system will incrementally enhance the existing prototype. The
current weakest point is the single photon detection. Detectors at 1550nm are avalanche
photodiodes with a 10-12% efficiency. A big step forward would be to find some new
materials to detect single photon energy levels or to use frequency converter to use efficient
detectors. A much higher efficiency would greatly lower the quantum error rate. This
would also enable the implementation of protocols more efficiently, but cause them to be
more sensitive to transmission errors.
The short term perspectives include the use of new communication protocols. It would
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be possible to transmit directly a message in the quantum channel. The strong reference
presence in the pulse would be used as well for continuous variable systems with homodyme
detection [30].
There is probably purpose and meaning in our journey, but it is the pathway that is
worth our while. Karin Boye.
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[1] Aćın, A., Gisin, N., and Scarani, V., “Coherent-pulse implementations of quantum
cryptography protocols resistant to photon-number-splitting attacks,” Phys. Rev. A,
vol. 69, no. 1, p. 012309, 2004.
[2] Agrawal, G. P., Fiber-Optic Communication Systems. John Wiley & Sons, 2002.
[3] Aspelmeyer, M., Jennewein, T., Pfennigbauer, M., Leeb, W. R., and
Zeilinger, A., “Long-distance quantum communication with entangled photons using
satellites,” Jour. of Sel. Top. in Quant. Elec., vol. 6, no. 6, pp. 1441–1451, 2003.
[4] Bechmann-Pasquinucci, H. and Gisin, N., “Incoherent and coherent eavesdropping
in the six-state protocol of quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 59, pp. 4238–
4248, June 1999.
[5] Bennett, C. H., “Quantum cryptography using any two nonorthogonal states,” Phys.
Rev. Lett., vol. 68, pp. 3121–3124, May 1992.
[6] Bennett, C. H., Bessette, F., Brassard, G., Salvail, L., and Smolin, “Exper-
imental quantum cryptography,” J. Crypto., vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 3–28, 1992.
[7] Bennett, C. H. and Brassard, G., “Quantum cryptography: Public key distribu-
tion and coin tossing,” in Proc. IEEE International Conference Computers, Systems
and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India, pp. 175–179, IEEE, New York, 1984.
[8] Bennett, C. H., Brassard, G., and Mermin, N. D., “Quantum cryptography
without Bell’s theorem,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 68, pp. 557–560, Feb. 1992.
[9] Biham, E., Boyer, M., Brassard, G., van de Graaf, J., and Mor, T., “Secu-
rity of quantum key distribution against all collective attacks,” Algorithmica, vol. 34,
pp. 372–388, Nov. 2002.
[10] Brandt, H. E., “Positive operator valued measure in quantum information pro-
cessing,” in Proceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering,
vol. 3385, (Orlando, FL, USA), pp. 23–35, 1998.
[11] Breguet, J., Muller, A., and Gisin, N., “Quantum cryptography with polarized
photons in optical fibres experiment and practical limits,” Jour. of Modern Optics,
vol. 41, pp. 2405–2412, Dec 1994.
[12] Burdell, G. P., “A Georgia Tech tradition,” Technique, vol. 15, p. 12, 1927.
[13] Buttler, W. T., Hughes, R. J., Lamoreaux, S. K., Morgan, G. L., Nordolt,
J. E., and Peterson, C. G., “Free-space quantum-key distribution,” Phys. Rev. A,
vol. 57, p. 2379, Apr. 1998.
123
[14] Buttler, W. T., Hughes, R. J., Lamoreaux, S. K., Morgan, G. L., Nordolt,
J. E., and Peterson, C. G., “Practical free-space quantum key distribution over 1
km,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 81, p. 3283, Oct. 1998.
[15] Buttler, W. T., Lamoreaux, S. K., Torgerson, J. R., Nickel, G. H., Don-
ahue, C. H., and Peterson, C. G., “Fast, efficient error reconciliation for quantum
cryptography,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 67, no. 5, p. 052303, 2003.
[16] Cerf, N. J., Levy, M., and Assche, G. V., “Quantum distribution of gaussian keys
using squeezed states,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 63, no. 5, p. 052311, 2001.
[17] Cirac, J. I. and Gisin, N., “Coherent eavesdropping strategies for the four state
quantum cryptography protocol,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 229, pp. 1–7, April 1997.
[18] Courtois, N. T. and Pieprzyk, J., “Cryptanalysis of block ciphers with overdefined
systems of equations,” in Asiacrypt 2002, pp. 267–287, 2002.
[19] Csiszar, I. and Körner, J., “Broadcast channels with confidential messages,” IEEE
Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. IT-24, no. 3, pp. 339–348, 1978.
[20] Daemen, J. and Rijmen, V., The Design of Rijndael. Springer-Verlag, 2002.
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Quantum Cryptography enables secret distribution between remotes parties
where classical communications fail. The proposed technique uses optical signal modulation
to encode information with relative phase difference between frequency separated signals.
The single side band detection scheme (SSB) enables efficient secret key distribution. The
system security is guaranteed with a strong reference protocol. One can use a fainted laser
source without security breach for any distance. A second proposed technique uses relative
phase difference between time separated pulses. The single side pulse detection scheme
(SSP) enables efficient secret key distribution and benefits the same security features as
the SSB system. Both SSP and SSB may be multiplexed to increase the secure bit rate.
The maximizing initial average energy is then one photon per pulse. The implemented SSB
protocol includes an autocompensation system for the optical path fluctuations that make
the system robust over long time periods.
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